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ABSTRACT 
Background: The first documented case of Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola) in Sierra Leone was 
confirmed in May 2014 in Kailahun district after cases had been reported in Guinea and 
Liberia. Ebola is transmitted through contact with infected blood, stool, and other bodily 
fluids. Transmission risk in West Africa was driven by traditional burials involving physical 
contact with corpses, caring for infected persons without adequate protection, and delaying 
medical care. Sexual transmission due to viral persistence in the semen of male survivors 
posed an additional risk. Experimental Ebola vaccine candidates were implemented to curb 
transmission among health workers and other high–risk individuals. Reporting of all deaths to 
a national toll–free line (1–1–7 system) was mandated so that burials could be handled by 
teams trained in infection prevention and control.  
Aim: To understand trends in population–level Ebola knowledge, attitudes and prevention 
practices throughout different stages of the outbreak, acceptability of experimental Ebola 
vaccines at the peak of the outbreak and reporting of deaths after the outbreak ended. 
Methods: Four cross–sectional household surveys (N=10,603) were conducted using multi–
stage cluster sampling in August 2014, October 2014, December 2014, and July 2015 to 
measure trends in Ebola–related knowledge, attitudes, and prevention practices (KAP). In–
depth interviews (N=31) and focus group discussions (N=35) were conducted with health 
workers, frontline workers, and community members between December 2014 and January 
2014 to understand acceptability of Ebola vaccine. Population–level demand for Ebola 
vaccine was assessed in a national household survey in December 2014 (N=3,540). After the 
outbreak ended, in 2017, motivations and barriers related to death reporting were assessed 
through a national telephone survey (N=1,291) and in–depth interviews (N=32). Quantitative 
data were analyzed using multilevel and ordered logistic regression modeling to examine 
various associations. Content analysis was used to identify cross–cutting themes in the 
qualitative data. 
Results: Ebola–related knowledge, attitudes, and prevention practices improved throughout 
the outbreak, especially in high–transmission regions. For example, when comparing before 
and after the peak of the outbreak, avoidance of physical contact with suspected Ebola 
patients nearly doubled in high–transmission areas (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 1.9 [95% 
confidence interval 1.4–2.5]). Acceptability of Ebola vaccine was discouraged by safety 
related concerns but encouraged by altruistic motivation to help end the outbreak. Nationally, 
74% of the public expressed high demand for Ebola vaccine, which was associated with 
wanting to be the first to get the vaccine compared to wanting politicians to be the first to get 
the vaccine (aOR 13.0; [7.8–21.6]). The number of deaths reported to the 1–1–7 system 
nationally in 2017 after the outbreak had ended represented nearly 12% of the expected 
deaths in the country versus almost 34% in 2016 and as much as 100% in 2015; albeit not 
accounting for potential duplicate reporting. After the Ebola outbreak, motivation to report 
deaths was greater if the decedent experienced one or more Ebola–like symptoms compared 
  
to none (aOR 2.3 [1.8–2.9]. Barriers to reporting deaths after the outbreak were driven by the 
lack of awareness to report all deaths, lack of reciprocal benefits linked to reporting, and 
negative experiences from the outbreak. 
Conclusions: Ebola prevention practices improved nationally during the outbreak in Sierra 
Leone, but the magnitude of improvement was greater in high–transmission regions 
compared to low–transmission regions. Understanding the drivers of Ebola vaccine 
acceptability and demand was important to inform ethical and cultural considerations in the 
implementation of experimental Ebola vaccines. While the 1–1–7 system was ramped up to 
capture nearly all deaths during the outbreak, reporting substantially declined after the 
outbreak ended. Failure to report deaths after the outbreak was due to lack of awareness to 
report all deaths and lack of perceived benefits to report in the post–Ebola–outbreak setting. 
Nevertheless, knowledge and experiences from the Ebola outbreak increasingly motivated 
people to report deaths that exhibited Ebola–like symptoms. Post–Ebola–outbreak settings 
offer an opportunity to implement routine mortality surveillance, however, substantial social 
mobilization efforts may be required to optimize reporting. 
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1 BACKGROUND 
1.1 EBOLA OUTBREAKS AND INCIDENTS BETWEEN 1976–2012 
Ebolavirus is among the world’s deadliest high–consequence pathogens. Although most 
people may not have heard about this deadly pathogen until the large 2014-2016 outbreak in 
West Africa, there had been over 20 documented outbreaks of Ebola Virus Disease (Ebola) 
across seven countries in sub–Saharan Africa between 1976 and 2012.1–21 These prior 
outbreaks resulted in almost 2,300 cases and 1,500 deaths combined (Figure 1).21 The first 
known outbreak of Ebola occurred in 1976 in Bumba Zone of Zaire–now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). The outbreak was detected near the Ebola River. It resulted in 318 
cases of viral hemorrhagic fever with 88% case fatality ratio (CFR).1 A similar hemorrhagic 
fever occurred around the same period in 1976 in Sudan. It was subsequently attributed to the 
Sudan ebolavirus, which resulted in 284 cases but with a lower CFR (~52%).2 A third strain, 
the Reston ebolavirus, was discovered in a primate facility in Philippines in 1989.22 Although 
three workers exposed to the virus in Philippines developed antibodies against it, none 
experienced Ebola Virus Disease.23 Reston ebolavirus was shortly thereafter detected in the 
United States in 1990 among monkeys imported from Philippines23 – four animal handlers 
developed Ebola antibodies without experiencing symptoms of the disease.24 A new strain, 
Taï Forest ebolavirus, infected a scientist conducting an autopsy on a Chimpanzee in 1994 in 
Cote D’Ivoire; he developed Ebola symptoms and later recovered from the disease.25  In 
2007, Uganda reported a new disease–causing strain, Bundibugyo ebolavirus, which had a 
lower CFR (~32%) compared to Zaire and Sudan strains.16  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of confirmed Ebola cases by the virus strain, 1976–2012  
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Several other incidents of persons becoming infected with Ebola in laboratory settings have 
also been documented in the United Kingdom and Russia.26 27 Between 1976 and 2012, the 
highest number of confirmed Ebola cases (of any strain) was recorded in DRC (n=968), 
followed by Uganda (n=574) and Sudan (n=335). The Zaire ebolavirus strain was responsible 
for ~60% of all confirmed cases and ~70% of all confirmed deaths during this period. The 
average CFR for the Zaire ebolavirus outbreaks was ~79% compared to ~53% and ~33% for 
the Sudan and Bundibugyo strains respectively. The single outbreak of just one case of the 
Taï Forest ebolavirus did not result in a death. The true CFR of the Taï Forest strain is 
unknown because there has only been one documented case of it that did not result in a death 
(Table 1).  
Table 1. Documented Ebola cases and deaths by virus strain and country, 1976–2012 
Year Country Cases* Deaths* CFR Ebolavirus strain 
1976 DRC 318 280 88% Zaire 
1976 Sudan 284 151 53% Sudan 
1977 DRC 1 1 100% Zaire 
1979 Sudan 34 22 65% Sudan 
1994 Cote D'Ivoire 1 0 0% Taï Forest 
1994 Gabon 52 31 60% Zaire 
1995 DRC 315 254 81% Zaire 
1996 Gabon 37 21 57% Zaire 
1996 Gabon 60 45 75% Zaire 
1996 South Africa 2 1 50% Zaire 
2001 Gabon 65 58 89% Zaire 
2001 Republic of the Congo 59 43 73% Zaire 
2001 Uganda 425 221 52% Sudan 
2002 Republic of the Congo 143 128 90% Zaire 
2003 Republic of the Congo 35 29 83% Zaire 
2004 Sudan 17 7 41% Sudan 
2005 Republic of the Congo 12 10 83% Zaire 
2007 DRC 264 187 71% Zaire 
2007 Uganda 131 42 32% Bundibugyo 
2008 DRC 32 15 47% Zaire 
2011 Uganda 1 1 100% Sudan 
2012 DRC 38 13 34% Bundibugyo 
2012 Uganda 11 4 36% Sudan 
2012 Uganda 6 3 50% Sudan 
*Data source: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history  
CFR = case fatality ratio; DRC = The Democratic Republic of Congo 
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Standard WHO case definitions for Ebola during an active outbreak are provided in Table 2. 
According to WHO guidance, Ebola case definition may be modified to reflect to the 
location–specific epidemiological features of the outbreak.28    
Table 2. Definitions of suspected, probable, and confirmed Ebola cases during an outbreak 
Classification Definition 
Suspected case A. “Any person, alive or dead, suffering or having suffered from a sudden onset of 
high fever and having had contact with:  
– a suspected, probable or confirmed Ebola case; 
– a dead or sick animal; OR 
B. Any person with sudden onset of high fever and at least three of the following 
symptoms: headaches, lethargy, anorexia / loss of appetite, aching muscles or 
joints, stomach pain, difficulty swallowing, vomiting difficulty breathing, 
diarrhea, hiccups; OR 
C. Any person with inexplicable bleeding; OR  
D. Any sudden, inexplicable death.” 
Probable case A. “Any suspected case evaluated by a clinician; OR  
B. Any deceased suspected case (where it has not been possible to collect specimens 
for laboratory confirmation) having an epidemiological link with a confirmed 
case.” 
Confirmed “Any suspected or probably cases with a positive laboratory result. 
Laboratory confirmed cases must test positive for the virus antigen, 
either by detection of virus RNA by reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction (RT– 
PCR), or by detection of IgM antibodies directed against Ebola.” 
None–case “Any suspected or probable case with a negative laboratory result. “Non–case” showed no 
specific antibodies, RNA or specific detectable antigens.” 
Source: Standard definitions by the World Health Organization; 
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/case–definition/en  
1.2 OUTBREAK IN WEST AFRICA (2014–2016) 
In March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared an Ebola outbreak in Guinea 
– though initial cases had been suspected in Guékédou as early as December 2013.29 The 
ensuing outbreak rapidly spread to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone,30 and was declared 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by WHO in August 2014.31 The 
outbreak in West Africa was caused by the Zaire ebolavirus.21 29 By the time the protracted 
outbreak was declared over in 201632, 28,652 cases (suspected, probable, and confirmed) had 
been reported across 10 countries spanning three continents through local transmissions or 
imported cases, and resulted in 11,325 Ebola deaths.33 34 Against a backdrop of fragile health 
systems,35 Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea were most heavily affected by the outbreak.21 
Sierra Leone recorded the highest number of cases and deaths.34 The overall CFR across the 
three countries has been estimated to be ~65% among clinical cases with known outcomes.36 
Other countries with Ebola cases derived from the West Africa outbreak included Nigeria, 
Mali, Senegal, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States.21 In Nigeria, prompt and 
effective contact tracing along with other control measures have been credited for curbing a 
potentially devastating outbreak in the highly populated commercial hub of Lagos in July–
August 2014.37 38 In 2018, a sixth strain, Bombali ebolavirus, was discovered in bats by 
researchers in Sierra Leone, but with no evidence to date of capability to cause disease in 
humans.39 Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire are members of the Mano River 
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Union—an international association for economic, social, and cultural cooperation among the 
four sub–regional member states.40 The three Ebola affected countries, therefore, had a long 
history of cross–country collaborations before the outbreak that enabled them to eventually 
institute cross–border cooperation measures in key areas of responding to the Ebola outbreak 
including for border screenings, contact tracing, and overall sub–regional coordination. The 
timelines of key events during the outbreak in West Africa have been illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Timelines of key events during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 2013–2016 
1.2.1 Transmission risks 
Ebola is thought to be initially transmitted from an infected animal such as bat or nonhuman 
primate to human; possibly through handling or eating of infected animals (bushmeat*) as 
well as eating fruits bitten by bats.41 Once in the human population, Ebola is transmitted from 
person–to–person through contact with infected blood, stool, semen, or other bodily fluids42 43 
– especially during the late stages of the disease when an infected person is most 
contagious.44 Understanding the full transmission dynamics of the epidemic in West Africa is 
complicated partly due to the under–reporting of cases.45 However, data from the affected 
countries in West Africa consistently point to Ebola transmission risks associated with 
traditional burial practices,41 46–48 caring for infected persons,41 and delays in seeking medical 
 
* Bushmeat broadly refers to wild animals that are hunted and prepared for consumption (e.g. bats and monkeys) 
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care.49 50 Sexual transmissions of ebolavirus were documented51 52 and attributed to viral 
persistence in the semen of male survivors.53–58 Containing Ebola transmission requires 
reducing the basic reproduction number (R0) by limiting the number of secondary infections 
derived from a case of Ebola.59 60  
1.2.2 Caring for Ebola patients 
Ebola infections have been widely documented among health care workers (HCWs) during 
the outbreak in West Africa.49 61 62 Early during the outbreak in Sierra Leone, one study 
estimated that HCWs had >100 times the risk of Ebola acquisition compared to non–health 
workers.61 The increased risk posed to health workers was driven by inadequate infection 
prevention and control measures in clinical settings.62 A retrospective descriptive study in 
Sierra Leone found that most HCW Ebola infections occurred in hospital settings (47%) 
while some occurred in health centers or other health facilities (23%) and at home (19%). 
Ebola treatment units were only associated with 27% of HCW Ebola infections.49 Family 
members caring for loved ones at home were also at high risk of Ebola. In some instances, 
home–based care may have resulted in further delay to seeking medical care among 
suspected patients, which contributed to household spread of the virus.63  
1.2.3 Traditional funerals and burials 
Traditional and religious norms for burials and funerals – such as touching, kissing, washing, 
and wrapping of corpses41  contributed to Ebola transmission risks.46 47 64 In the West Africa 
outbreak, it was retrospectively estimated that every unsafe traditional burial resulted in 
nearly three new Ebola cases.64 In an extreme example in Sierra Leone, 28 confirmed cases 
were derived from a single traditional burial of a prominent pharmacist in Moyamba district 
in September 2014.46 Almost all of the 28 cases (75%) reported direct physical contact with 
the pharmacist’s corpse. Similarly in Guinea, 62 new cases were directly linked to a single 
traditional burial ceremony in Kissidougou in December 2014 – the largest increase in 
weekly new cases of Ebola in any prefecture in Guinea.47  
1.2.4 Sexual transmission and viral persistence 
A cohort study in Sierra Leone found Ebola virus RNA in the semen of survivors for up to 18 
months after discharge from treatment units based on quantitative reverse transcription– 
polymerase chain reaction testing.65 Following the peak of the primary outbreaks in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, sexual transmissions occurred, and were linked to viral 
persistence in the semen of Ebola survivors.51 52 66 These flareups pointed to the continued 
risk of Ebola transmission in the subregion and the need for ongoing, robust viral 
hemorrhagic fever surveillance in accordance with WHO’s International Health 
Regulations.67  
1.3 OUTBREAK IN SIERRA LEONE (2014–2016) 
The first known case of Ebola in Sierra Leone was confirmed on May 25th 2014 in the 
Eastern region of Kailahun district,30 few kilometers from the origin of the Guinea outbreak 
in Guékédou. The Sierra Leone index case was traced to a traditional healer in Kpondu 
village (Kailahun) who treated patients from Guinea and Liberia. The traditional healer died 
and infected other close relatives and those who attended her funeral.68 Within few days, 
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several suspected cases from Kpondu village tested positive for Ebola, and new cases were 
quickly confirmed in other nearby villages.68 The outbreak rapidly spread to neighboring 
Kenema district, making the Eastern region the epicenter of the early phase of the outbreak 
and requiring massive contact tracing efforts.69 By October 2014, the epicenter of the 
outbreak had strongly shifted from the Eastern region to the Western and Northern regions. 
New weekly cases of Ebola peaked in November 2014. The epidemic curve began a 
downturn in December 2014. Lower but continued number of new cases and deaths were 
reported in the first half of 2015 before the outbreak waned substantially. In November 2015, 
the WHO declared an end of the outbreak in Sierra Leone.33 Controlling the outbreak 
required a comprehensive response from many sectors of government, international partners 
and civil society. The response comprised a number of key interventions, including incident 
management, surveillance, contact tracing, rapid isolation and treatment, infection control, 
safe burials, laboratory testing, social mobilization, risk communication and partner 
coordination.70 In January 2016, a flareup of Ebola was reported in Sierra Leone and 
promptly controlled, and since then no more cases have been reported to date.71  
1.3.1 Coordination  
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the pillar structures instituted for responding to the Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone.72 Immediately after confirming the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, 
the Government with support from international partners such as WHO and the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), established an Emergency Operations Center 
under the leadership of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS).73  
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the Ebola outbreak response structure in Sierra Leone 
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By June 2014, response pillars for case management, surveillance, safe and dignified burials, 
laboratory operations, and social mobilization were established within the Emergency 
Operations Center. In October 2014, near the peak of the outbreak, the National Ebola 
Response Center (NERC) was commissioned by the President of Sierra Leone to assume all 
coordination and decision–making responsibilities. Incident management structures were 
subsequently transitioned to the NERC, including a total of 35,000 local response staff. 73 The 
NERC became functional by November 2014 and established District Ebola Response 
Centers in each of the 14 districts in the country.  
1.3.2 Case management 
A person infected with Ebola usually experiences symptoms within two to 21 days of 
exposure to the virus. Early symptoms commonly occur within eight to 10 days including 
fever, severe headache, muscle pain, abdominal pain, and fatigue.74 In previous outbreaks, as 
the disease progresses, it was documented that patients may experience unexplained bleeding, 
diarrhea, and vomiting. However, one study in Sierra Leone found that up to 18% of Ebola 
cases did not experience fever,75 and another study revealed that bleeding was very rare such 
that only one out of 106 patients experienced bleeding in a non–representative sample from 
Kenema district between May 25 and June 18, 2014.76 One study revealed that extreme 
fatigue, vomiting, diarrhea, and bleeding were significantly associated with not surviving the 
disease.75 Factors associated with fatal outcomes in another study of patients included fever, 
weakness, dizziness, diarrhea, and elevated levels of blood urea nitrogen, aspartate 
aminotransferase, and creatinine. The risk of death among patients in the same study was also 
higher for those who were over 45 years of age and those with high viral load (10 million 
Ebolavirus copies per milliliter or more).76 Ebola symptoms are similar to those of malaria, 
which posed challenges for screening and initial clinical case management.77  
 
In Sierra Leone, patients suspected of Ebola were reported to the National Ebola Call Center 
through a tollfree telephone line—the 1–1–7 call system—or through local district alert 
systems. The 1–1–7 phone alert system was used by the Government of Sierra Leone to 
ensure identification of sick patients and deaths occurring in communities. The placing of 
sick alerts prompted the dispatch of ambulance teams to pick up and transport patients to 
Ebola holding centers.78 Suspected patients were screened and tested for Ebola at holding 
centers. Patients who tested positive for Ebola were transferred to an Ebola treatment unit. 
Community care centers (with lower level of care given) were also used as alternatives to 
treatment units in parts of Sierra Leone.59 Even though there were no specific treatments for 
Ebola, patients received supportive care including administration of intravenous fluids† and 
use of antimalarials and antibiotics to treat other potential co–occurring infections.76 
Experimental therapeutics were used in some cases, especially towards the end of the 
outbreak when study and treatment protocols were in place.79 80 Patients were usually released 
from clinical care after two or more negative Ebola test results.  
 
† Especially in the latter stages of the epidemic; very few patients received IV fluids in the first few months. 
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1.3.3 Surveillance 
Various surveillance efforts formed a key pillar of the Ebola response in West Africa.81 
Surveillance mechanisms were instituted to promptly identify suspected Ebola cases, (and 
their contacts) and deaths occurring in communities.69 70 78 81 These efforts required the 
strengthening of data systems and human resource capacities including the training of 
surveillance officers and other personnel.81 In August 2014, the Government of Sierra Leone 
introduced the mandatory 1–1–7 call system for reporting suspected Ebola cases and deaths 
occurring in communities.82 Nearly 350,000 alerts about cases and deaths were placed 
through the 1–1–7 call system between September 2014 and December 2016. 
1.3.3.1 Contact tracing 
At the peaks of the outbreak in the three heavily affected countries, contact tracing proved to 
be challenging given the large number of contacts to identify and follow–up on. A 
retrospective analysis in Sierra Leone’s Kenema district revealed that only 6% of probable 
and confirmed cases in the district were recorded as contacts.69 Overall, contact tracing 
challenges included identifying, locating, and enrolling contacts coupled with community 
fear, stigma, and misconceptions.83 Following the peak of new cases, efforts were taken by 
the MoHS and surveillance partners to intensify and improve the quality of contact tracing in 
the active transmission areas.70 For instance, when robust surveillance efforts were mounted 
in response to the January 2016 flareup in Sierra Leone, 131 contacts were swiftly identified 
and one additional case emerged from a high–risk contact.81  
1.3.4 Burials 
Monitoring and responding to deaths (of any causes) consisted a major aspect of the Ebola 
response. In Sierra Leone, all deaths were mandated to be reported through the 1–1–7 call 
system or local district alert systems.78 Once a death alert was triggered, teams specialized in 
safe burials and surveillance officers were dispatched to the household. Burials were then 
conducted according to protocols for safe and dignified burials excluding traditional practices 
involving direct contact with corpses.84 Challenges with death reporting were documented, 
including delays in responding to death alerts and community dissatisfaction with burial 
protocols that prohibited traditional rituals.84 85 Alternatives were later provided for families 
to observe the burial from a safe distance and have a religious leader say a final prayer before 
burying the corpse. The interfaith community strongly advocated for these alternatives.86 
Death reporting through the 1–1–7 system in Sierra Leone was high during the peak of active 
transmission of Ebola, such that nearly 10,000 calls were made on a single day in October 
2014 around the peak of the outbreak.78‡ However, death reporting levels declined as the 
outbreak waned in the country despite government policy requiring reporting.78 It remains 
unclear what factors motivate or discourage the population to report deaths during the post–
outbreak environment in Sierra Leone. It should be noted that the initial outbreak in Guinea 
took three months to be detected, partly due to weak mortality surveillance systems at the 
time. The Ebola epidemic demonstrated the need for robust surveillance systems including 
 
‡ Almost 100 new cases were reported daily around the peak period of the outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
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mechanisms for mortality surveillance to improve early detection of cluster–deaths indicative 
of a possible disease outbreak.46 70 81 
1.3.5 Social mobilization 
Social mobilization, community engagement, and risk communication were central 
components of the Ebola response in West Africa, and suggested to have contributed to the 
containment of the spiraling outbreak alongside clinical interventions.87–90 A case study from 
Liberia demonstrated the positive effects of social mobilization in interrupting Ebola 
transmission by improving community support for contact tracing and isolation of cases.91  
 
A Social Mobilization Pillar was formed in June 2014 to coordinate and guide all social 
mobilization, community engagement, and risk communication activities for the national 
Ebola response. The Social Mobilization Pillar had over 100 partners including NGOs, civil 
society groups, governmental ministries, and international technical support agencies such as 
the CDC. The Health Education Division of the MoHS chaired the Social Mobilization Pillar 
alongside UNICEF. The Social Mobilization Action Consortium provided broad secretariat 
services to the pillar with funding from the UK Department for International Development. 
The Pillar established four subcommittees for: (i) coordination, monitoring, and evaluation; 
(ii) capacity building; (iii) messaging and dissemination; and (iv) special needs (including 
psychosocial support).  
 
A communication strategy and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for social mobilization 
were developed and implemented over the course of the outbreak in Sierra Leone. The 
government’s post–outbreak report articulates the important role of social mobilization and 
community engagement: “Social mobilization is successful when there is mutual trust and 
respect between the leaders and their communities, which increase public participation and 
boost their sense of ownership.”73 
1.3.5.1 Communication strategy and messaging 
The Social Mobilization Pillar, with technical support from FOCUS 1000 (a local NGO), 
CDC’s Health Promotion Team, and UNICEF, launched a national Ebola response 
communication strategy in September 2014. Preliminary findings from a population–based 
national survey on knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to Ebola prevention and 
treatment directly informed the strategy. Overall, the approach called for shifting away from 
one–way communication (e.g. using megaphones) to multi–channel approaches grounded in 
evidence–based messaging to target high–risk behaviors and high–risk environments. 
Indicators were established for monitoring and evaluating behavioral change communication 
efforts implemented by partners in the Social Mobilization Pillar collectively. A 
comprehensive messaging guide,92 named Act Against Ebola, was developed in September 
2014 to operationalize the communication strategy. Based on risk communication lessons 
learned from CDC’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Act Against Ebola emphasized 
specific protective and enabling behaviors.93 
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1.3.5.2 Radio programming 
In August 2014, a nationwide survey revealed that nearly 90% of the public received Ebola 
information through radio programs in Sierra Leone.93 The Social Mobilization Pillar’s 
strategy therefore called for prioritizing radio due to its widespread availability and frequent 
use among the population to receive information. For example, through the Ebola Big Idea of 
the Week messaging guide,94 national radio programs were developed and simultaneously 
broadcast across the country to reach the population with harmonized messages promoting 
key Ebola protective behaviors. District and sub–district level radio programs were also 
implemented to allow for localized discourse through interactive formats where listeners were 
able to call–in with questions, comments, and feedback. BBC Media Action supported 42 
radio stations across the country to strengthen local capacity, accessibility, and quality of 
radio programming in Sierra Leone.95 A survey reported high listenership (68%) of two radio 
programs sponsored by BBC Media Action through local stations:  Kick Ebola out of Sierra 
Leone and Kick Ebola Live.95  
1.3.5.3 Engagement of religious leaders 
Religion plays an important role in the lives of Sierra Leoneans. Nearly every Sierra Leonean 
self–identifies as either a Muslim (78%) or Christian (21%).96 Faith–based engagement with 
religious leaders was therefore a key approach for social mobilization in the Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa, especially in promoting safe burial practices.97 Early in the outbreak in Sierra 
Leone, before the engagement of religious leaders, there were instances of some religious 
leaders contributing to Ebola transmission by participating in unsafe burials.98 Therefore, 
various interventions focused on promoting safe burial behaviors among religious leaders so 
that they could role model protective behaviors in their communities.86 The Social 
Mobilization Pillar prioritized religious leader engagement, which was deemed critical to 
attaining community acceptance of Ebola protective behaviors, especially relating to adopting 
safe burials.98 Over 6,000 religious leaders across the country were engaged through local 
grassroots structures.86 99 The engagement included development of faith–based messages 
using examples and passages from the Qur’an and Bible to reinforce key Ebola prevention 
behaviors with an emphasis on shifting from traditional burials to safe burials conducted by 
specialized teams.86 100 Faith–based organization implemented interventions that created more 
direct role for religious leaders in the response such as escorting burial teams, praying on 
corpses, and providing psychosocial counseling to bereaved families.86 101 
1.3.5.4 Engagement of traditional healers 
Traditional healers were rarely engaged early in the Ebola response in Sierra Leone until June 
2015 when FOCUS 1000, through the Social Mobilization Pillar, convened a large–scale 
meeting with a diverse cross–section of national and grassroots leadership of the country’s 
Indigenous Traditional Healers Union.102 103  The convening was sparked by WHO and 
MoHS pointing to Ebola transmission chains linked to traditional healing practices for 
suspected Ebola patients – most notably in Port Loko and Kambia districts.104–106 Public 
pressure and intensified direct advocacy and engagements with the healers’ union led to their 
suspension of traditional healing practices. The healers leadership proposed a Bush–to–Bush 
Campaign to monitor secret shrines and ensure compliance of their members with the 
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sanction.102  The Bush–to–Bush Campaign was then incorporated into an existing campaign 
(Operation Northern Push) in Port Loko and Kambia districts between June and August 2015. 
Following the end of the campaign, transmission chains linked to traditional healing practices 
were disrupted.107 
1.3.5.5 Community–led Ebola action 
Restless Development, an international NGO with strong local ties in Sierra Leone, oversaw 
the development of the Community–led Ebola Action intervention comprising practical 
training of local mobilizers in community action planning.108 Trained mobilizers were paired 
to visit assigned communities, identify needs and challenges through dialogue, and trigger 
community action plans to prevent and respond to Ebola. Mobilizers made routine follow–up 
visits to monitor and document the progress of community action plans. Restless 
Development implemented the intervention in 11 mostly rural districts. The organization 
trained and deployed over 2,500 community mobilizers who collectively worked across 
nearly 9,000 rural communities and made 49,000 follow–up visits on community–led action 
plans by November 2015.109 The community–led intervention was also implemented in 
Western Area and Kenema districts by GOAL Ireland.109 
1.3.5.6 National house–to–house campaigns 
Two house–to–house campaigns were implemented nationally in Sierra Leone in September 
201482 and March 2015.110 Each campaign lasted three days and were part of government–led 
efforts to intensify active case search within communities and dissemination of Ebola 
prevention messages through joint teams of surveillance officers, contact tracers, community 
mobilizers, and community leaders. Movements were restricted during the campaigns to help 
ensure all households and individuals were reached. During the three–day period of the first 
campaign in 2014, a retrospective analysis showed that 3,299 call alerts were placed to the 1–
1–7 system comprising 1,296 reported deaths and 1,202 reported suspected cases. The second 
campaign in 2015 was launched as part of a broader initiative – Zero Ebola Campaign – 
leading to over 60% increase in calls placed to the 1–1–7 reporting system compared to the 
previous week.110  
1.3.5.7 Operation Western Area Surge 
In Western Area, the NERC recognized the need for more targeted efforts for active case 
search integrated with social mobilization through Operation Western Area Surge.111 112 The 
campaign focused on increasing community demand for Ebola services while also enhancing 
contact tracing and supply–side capacities such as the number of beds in Ebola treatment 
units and more responsive laboratory systems to test for Ebola.111 112  
1.3.5.8 Standardizing operating procedures for social mobilization 
Social mobilization efforts became more streamlined and refined after the peak of the 
outbreak in Sierra Leone. The Social Mobilization Pillar conducted district–level 
microplanning workshops to develop SOPs for social mobilization in the final push in 
“getting to zero Ebola” in the country.113 The SOP document outlined specific procedures and 
processes for social mobilization in supporting various Ebola response efforts – including 
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case identification, safe burials, contact tracing, and household–based quarantine – in order to 
ensure more effective integration with supply–side services.113   
1.3.5.9 Challenges with social mobilization 
There were myriad challenges with the planning, implementation, and monitoring/evaluation 
of social mobilization activities during the outbreak in Sierra Leone.73 88 99 108 113 114 First, in 
the early stage of the outbreak, the messaging was slow to focus on person–to–person 
transmission and over emphasized animal–to–human transmission. Prevention messages 
therefore focused on avoiding the preparation, handling, and eating of bushmeat. There was a 
lack of initial emphasis on the risk of unsafe burials and having physical contact with sick 
people at home or elsewhere in the community. The initial response was slow to engage 
trusted community leaders including religious and traditional leaders, and even slower to 
engage traditional healers. Although the Social Mobilization Pillar was established early in 
the outbreak, it faced challenges with getting funding to support nationwide activities and to 
scaleup in the high–transmission areas. Coordinating the large number of pillar members 
(over 100 organizations) posed additional challenges throughout the outbreak but improved 
over time. For instance, the messaging subcommittee became responsible for harmonizing 
and approving all messages that partners were disseminating through media sources and 
direct engagements with communities.     
1.4 EBOLA KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES, AND PRACTICES 
Several quantitative and qualitative assessments of the public’s Ebola–related knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices (KAP) were conducted in Sierra Leone,85 93 115–121 Guinea,122–124 
Liberia,125 126 Nigeria.127 128 In Sierra Leone, KAP surveys targeting the general public were 
conducted at different stages of the outbreak including as early as August 2014 and as late as 
July 2015. Findings from the various KAP surveys consistently pointed to high awareness of 
Ebola transmission and prevention but with predominant misconceptions regarding the 
disease. The findings from Sierra Leone were consistent with those from the other countries. 
A multilevel regression analysis found that, in Sierra Leone, exposure to Ebola–related 
information sources had a strong dose–response association with having the correct Ebola 
knowledge and reporting protective behaviors.129 However, information exposure was also 
associated with misconceptions (but with a weaker dose–response). Trends in how Ebola–
related KAP changed over time (when, where, and for whom) has not been well documented 
in the published literature. Moreover, differences in KAP outcomes over time between 
geographic regions with high– and low–transmission regions are not well understood.  
1.5 EBOLA SURVIVORS 
Although it is difficult to know the exact number of Ebola survivors during the 2014–2016 
outbreak in West Africa, the WHO estimated that there may have been up to 10,000 Ebola 
survivors across Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia.130 Sierra Leone had the largest cohort of 
nearly 4,000 Ebola survivors, of whom nearly 3,000 were registered in the government’s 
database as of March 2016.33 Ebola survivors faced numerous challenges after their release 
from treatment units as they integrated back into their communities, including clinical post–
Ebola syndrome,131–139 stigmatization,120 140 and psychological distress.141 142 Nearly 80% of 
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survivors were reportedly able to access health care services in Sierra Leone as of March 
2016.33 However, current estimates for survivors’ access to care are lacking. In December 
2017, a local NGO (Center for Accountability and Rule of Law) filed a lawsuit on behalf of 
survivors against the Government of Sierra Leone that alleged misappropriation of Ebola 
funds and demanded greater support for survivors.143 
1.5.1 Post–Ebola syndrome  
Following release from treatment units, clinical sequelae have been documented among 
Ebola survivors, collectively termed post–Ebola syndrome, which included myalgia (muscle 
aches), arthralgia (joint pain), headache, abdominal pain, visual problems, weight loss, 
memory loss, hearing loss, insomnia, fatigue, decreased libido and depression.131–139 In Sierra 
Leone, analysis of post–Ebola syndrome showed that survivors experienced musculoskeletal 
pain (70%), headache (48%), and visual problems (14%). Collectively, these findings point to 
the need for longer–term medical care and psychosocial support for survivors.  
1.5.2 Stigma and psychosocial challenges 
Moreover, Ebola survivors and their families faced stigma and discrimination as they 
reintegrated into communities.120 140 Early in the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, every 9 in 
10 respondents in a national survey held one or more stigmatizing attitudes towards Ebola 
survivors such as refraining from buying fresh vegetables from a survivor shopkeeper, not 
accepting survivors back into communities, and thinking that survivors who are students put 
the class at risk of Ebola infection.93 As the outbreak waned in Guinea, survivors continued to 
face stigmatization.122 HCWs who cared for Ebola patients were also stigmatized.140 The 
Ebola response in West Africa recognized the need to address the high and persistent level of 
stigma towards Ebola survivors. In Sierra Leone, the communication and messaging strategy 
was to portray survivors as heroes that should be embraced and celebrated for defeating the 
scourge of Ebola. Such messaging also aimed to create a more hopeful narrative that would 
encourage treatment seeking behaviors when Ebola was suspected as opposed to hiding 
patients at home, which might put other household members at risk of Ebola acquisition.93  
 
The situation of Ebola survivors became further complicated when new Ebola cases were 
linked to viral persistence in the semen of male survivors,53–58 65 144 145 and more evidence 
surfaced regarding persistence of the virus in other bodily fluids.132 146 Several clusters of 
Ebola cases were later tied to sexual transmission of the disease.51 52 Emerging messaging 
about sexual transmission of Ebola by survivors might have unintentionally contributed to 
further stigmatization of survivors and their sexual partners.120 Interventions were instituted 
to screen and test the semen of male Ebola survivors147–149 and provide behavioral counseling 
and support, especially around condom use among survivors and their sexual partners.124 150  
1.6 EBOLA VACCINES 
Experimental Ebola vaccines were implemented in Liberia,151 152 Guinea,153 and Sierra 
Leone154–156 as part of safety, immunogenicity, efficacy clinical trials and ring vaccination 
efforts to reduce transmission risk among contacts (and contacts of contacts) of Ebola 
cases/deaths.153 In Liberia, 1,500 adult participants were enrolled in the PREVAIL study.151 
In Guinea over 5,000 community participants were included in a ring vaccination cluster–
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randomized trial, in which the vaccine was found to be 100% effective.153  In Sierra Leone, 
over 8,000 health care and front line workers participated in the STRIVE Ebola vaccine 
study154 156 and over 750 in the EBOVAC–Salone study157 (including 192 adolescents and 
132 children). 
 
Social mobilization and community engagement were cited as important considerations 
across all the vaccine trials in the three affected countries. More pronouncedly, a qualitative 
study for an Ebola vaccine trial in Kambia district highlighted strategies employed for social 
mobilization in gaining community–level support for the trial and addressing concerns.158 
Lessons learned from the STRIVE trial also reinforced the important role of ethical 
communication of risks and benefits as well as establishment of a social mobilization 
platform to support ethical recruitment and addressing of community concerns. 
 
The unlicensed rVSV–ZEBOV–GP§ vaccine was implemented under compassionate use 
protocols during outbreaks in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and DRC.159–164 In October 
2019, the rVSV–ZEBOV–GP vaccine eventually received conditional marketing 
authorization from the European Medicines Agency165 and was prequalified for licensing in 
November 2019 by the WHO through an accelerated process. In December 2019, the rVSV–
ZEBOV–GP vaccine, manufactured by Merck & Co., Inc. under the tradename Ervebo®, 
was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for use in individuals age 18 years 
of age and older as a single–dose injectable vaccine packaged in 1 milliliter single–dose 
vials.166 The rVSV–ZEBOV–GP vaccine is administered through the intramuscular route, 
preferably on the deltoid area of the non–dominant arm. The duration of protection has not 
yet been established. Consequently, the need for booster dose(s) remains undetermined. Other 
Ebola prevention and control measures are therefore recommended for individuals who 
receive the vaccine—including adequate PPE for HCWs. Adverse reactions to the vaccine 
include pain at the injection site, swelling or redness, headache, fever, muscle pain, fatigue, 
nausea, and joint pain. Four African countries have since licensed the Merck vaccine: DRC, 
Burundi, Ghana, and Zambia.166 The availability of licensed doses of the vaccine paves the 
way for increasing its stockpile in countries and subregions prone to Ebola outbreaks.  
 
An investigational Ebola vaccine regimen (Ad26.ZEBOV, MVA–BN–Filo) manufactured by 
Janssen Pharmaceutical Companies of Johnson & Johnson has also been used as part of 
clinical trials in West Africa and outbreak response in DRC.167 168 It is a two–dose regime that 
combines two vaccines to stimulate an immune response to the Zaire ebolavirus. The first 
dose is Ad26.ZEBOV. The second dose, MVA–BN–Filo®, is administered around eight 
weeks from the first dose.  
 
§ Recombinant, replication–competent, vesicular stomatitis virus expressing the glycoprotein of a Zaire 
Ebolavirus (Merck & Co., Inc). 
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1.7 OUTBREAK IMPACT 
The West African Ebola epidemic had negative impacts on economies and livelihoods,169–171 
health systems,171–173 medical care seeking behaviors for other health needs,171–175 and 
population–level mental health.176 177 In Sierra Leone, it was conservatively estimated that 
decreased use of health services resulted in 3,600 additional maternal, neonatal, and stillbirths 
between 2014 and 2015.173 Another study in Sierra Leone revealed population–level, mental 
health impact showing high prevalence of symptoms of anxiety, depression, and post–
traumatic stress disorder.118 On the other hand, enormous epidemic response efforts resulted 
in strengthened health systems in some areas (e.g. surveillance, laboratory capacity, health 
workforce capacity) by the time the outbreak was declared over, which may have contributed 
to overall preparedness for future outbreaks.81 
1.8 RATIONALE 
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa shed new light on the complexities surrounding infectious 
disease outbreaks. It illuminated the need for social, behavioral, and communication science 
as an integral component of global health security in preventing, detecting, and responding to 
known and emerging public health threats. The methods and findings in this thesis can inform 
future infectious disease outbreak response actions aiming to address sociocultural 
perceptions and behavioral factors linked to transmission risks. In addition, the data collection 
instruments and methods of this thesis can be further adapted for other similar settings and 
contribute to preparedness efforts to undertake mixed–methods behavioral surveillance 
during Ebola and other infectious disease outbreaks.  
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2 AIMS  
2.1 OVERALL AIM 
To understand trends in population–level Ebola knowledge, attitudes and practices at 
different stages of the outbreak (Study I), acceptability of experimental Ebola vaccines at 
around the peak of the outbreak (Studies II–III) and reporting of deaths after the outbreak 
ended (Studies IV–V). 
2.2 SPECIFIC AIMS 
The specific aims of the assessments were to: 
I. Examine trends in Ebola knowledge, acceptance of safe burials, attitudes toward 
Ebola survivors, and uptake of prevention practices throughout the 2014–2016 Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone (Study I / Paper I). 
 
II. Understand how experimental Ebola vaccines were perceived by health workers, 
frontline staff and the general public prior to any experimental Ebola vaccine trials  
(Study II / Paper II). 
 
III. Measure Ebola vaccine demand among the general public around the peak of the 
outbreak and identify predictors of Ebola vaccine demand (Study III / Paper III). 
 
IV. Describe the deaths reported to the 1–1–7 system during and after the outbreak, 
perceptions of the reporting system, and motivations to report deaths in a post–Ebola–
outbreak setting (Study IV / Paper IV). 
 
V. Identify death reporting barriers and potential facilitators in the aftermath of an Ebola 
outbreak to inform strategies to improve mortality surveillance (Study V / Paper V).  
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3 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
To address the overall and specific aims, mixed–methods behavioral surveillance approaches 
were employed comprising multiple population–based household KAP surveys, a telephone 
survey, in–depth interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).  
3.1 SUMMARY 
The study population, timeline, setting, design, sampling approach, and analytical methods 
for each of the five studies are summarized in Table 3. Studies I–III were conducted during 
the 2014–2016 outbreak in Sierra Leone while Studies IV–V were carried out in 2017 after 
the outbreak when enhanced Ebola surveillance had ended. All studies included respondents 
from the general public. In addition, Study II included HCWs and frontline Ebola staff such 
as ambulance drivers, burial team members, contact tracers, and community mobilizers. 
Study IV included family members and health workers who reported one or more deaths to 
the national 1–1–7 system after enhanced Ebola surveillance ended.  Study V included 
family members who failed to report a death to the 1–1–7 system as mandated by the 
Government of Sierra Leone.  
Table 3. Methodological summary of the five studies in the doctoral thesis 
Study Population Timeline Design and sampling Outcome measures Data analysis 
DURING THE OUTBREAK 
Study 
I 
General 
public  
 
Aug 
2014 – 
Jul 2015 
Four cross–sectional 
household surveys 
(N=10,603) using multi–
cluster stage sampling 
 
Ebola–related 
knowledge, attitudes, 
and practices 
Multilevel logistic 
regression 
modeling  
 
Study 
II 
HCWs, 
frontline 
staff, and 
general 
public 
Dec  
2014 – 
Jan 2015 
Qualitative in–depth 
interviews (N=31) and 
focus group discussions 
(N=35) using purposive 
sampling 
 
Perceptions and 
acceptability of Ebola 
vaccine 
Qualitative content 
analysis 
Study 
III 
General 
public 
Dec 2014 Cross–sectional 
household survey 
(N=3,540) using multi–
stage cluster sampling 
 
Ebola vaccine 
demand  
Multilevel logistic 
regression 
modeling; 
Exploratory Factor 
Analysis 
 
AFTER THE OUTBREAK & ENHANCED EBOLA SURVEILLANCE ENDED 
Study 
IV 
General 
public 
Apr 2017 Telephone survey 
(N=1,291) using 
stratified random 
sampling 
Number of deaths 
reported over time; 
motivations to report 
deaths  
 
Ordered logistic 
regression 
modeling 
Study 
V 
General 
public  
Aug 
2017 
Qualitative in–depth 
interviews (N=32) using 
purposive sampling 
Barriers and 
facilitators of death 
reporting 
Qualitative content 
analysis 
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Studies I, III, IV employed quantitative methodologies. Studies I & III were based on 
population–level surveys conducted using multi–stage cluster sampling. Study IV was a 
telephone survey using stratified random sampling. Studies II & V employed exploratory 
qualitative approaches: In–depth interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The 
quantitative studies have been described in accordance with  guidelines for Strengthening the 
Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE).178 The qualitative studies 
have been described in accordance with guidelines in the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting 
Qualitative Research (COREQ), which is a 32–item checklist for reporting the methods and 
procedures used in a qualitative study.179 Data from the three quantitative studies were 
analyzed using multilevel logistic regression (Study I and III) and ordered logistic 
regression (Study IV) modeling. The qualitative data (Study II and V) were analyzed using 
qualitative content analysis.180  
3.2 STUDY SETTINGS 
All five studies were carried out in Sierra Leone during the 2014–2016 outbreak of Ebola or 
shortly thereafter in 2017 after the end of enhanced Ebola surveillance. Sierra Leone has an 
estimated population of eight million people, four geographic regions (West, North, East, 
South), and 14 administrative districts.181  The country is culturally diverse with more than 20 
ethnic tribes and local languages. Even though English is the official language of business, 
Krio is the predominant language spoken by most Sierra Leoneans, and most Sierra Leoneans 
identify as either Muslim or Christian.96 Most of the population reside in rural areas, and 
more than half of the population are illiterate.96   
The country endured a brutal civil war that lasted more than a decade spanning from 1991 to 
2002 wherein countless children were exploited as soldiers.182 183 During this period, most of 
the country’s infrastructure – including health and social services systems – were destroyed. 
Following the war, the country entered a reconstruction phase that focused on rebuilding of 
health systems, especially for maternal and child health. Reconstruction efforts culminated in 
the government’s introduction of the Free Health Care Initiative in 2010 to eliminate costs for 
essential health services for pregnant women, lactating mothers, and children under the age of 
five years old.184 185 Despite efforts to improve the situation, Sierra Leone has one of the 
highest maternal mortality ratios and under–five mortality rates in the world: about 105 
children per every 1,000 live births die before celebrating their fifth birthday186 and an 
estimated 1,180 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.187 About half of the population lives 
in extreme poverty.187 Part of the challenge is due to major gaps in the human resources for 
health: there is only one medical doctor for every 10,000 population.187 
Study I was implemented to assess changes over time in Ebola–related KAP among the 
general public at four different stages of the outbreak in Sierra Leone (August 2014, October 
2014, December 2014, July 2015). In August 2014, when the first assessment was 
undertaken, the epicenter of the outbreak was occurring in the Eastern region of the country 
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with cases mostly reported in Kailahun and Kenema districts. By October 2014, when the 
second assessment was conducted, the epicenter had shifted to the Western and Northern 
regions. At this point, all 14 districts nationally had also reported cases of Ebola. The weekly 
number of new Ebola cases peaked nationally in November 2014, which was right before the 
third assessment was undertaken in December 2014. Even though the outbreak had peaked 
nationally, there was an increase of new cases reported in Western region comprising the 
capital city of Freetown. 
Studies II–III were undertaken in the backdrop of plans to investigate the safety and efficacy 
of candidate Ebola vaccines among health workers and frontline Ebola staff.  Study II was 
conducted to qualitatively understand perceptions and acceptability of experimental Ebola 
vaccines, and was conducted with health workers, frontline Ebola staff, and the general 
public in five districts that were experiencing Ebola transmission. The assessment was carried 
out in December 2014 around the peak of the outbreak, and before any Ebola vaccine had 
been introduced in the country. Although plans to introduce Ebola vaccine trials commenced 
in October 2014, the first clinical trial of a candidate Ebola vaccine was not implemented 
until April 2015.154 Study III was carried out to quantitatively describe Ebola vaccine 
demand and identify associated predictors of demand among the general public in December 
2014.  
Studies IV–V were conducted in 2017 after the Ebola outbreak had been declared over in 
Sierra Leone in November 2015. However, in January 2016, a flare–up of Ebola occurred in 
the country, which was linked to sexual transmission due to viral persistence in an Ebola 
male survivor. Although the flare–up was promptly contained, it reinforced the need for 
vigilance in surveillance systems to identify and respond to emerging threats of new cases. 
Study IV was carried out in April 2017 with household members from the general public and 
health workers who had reported a death to the 1–1–7 system established by the government. 
Lastly, Study V was conducted in August 2017 with family members who had a death in 
their household but failed to report such death to the 1–1–7 system as per government policy. 
The purpose of the government policy was to inform efforts to strengthen routine mortality 
surveillance with additional considerations for improving civil registration of vital statistics 
(CRVS). Following nearly two years of national reporting of all deaths as part of Ebola 
mortality surveillance, Sierra Leone had a unique opportunity to strengthen the death 
registration component of CRVS. As part of global efforts spearheaded by WHO, CRVS 
systems aim to register all births and deaths occurring in a country. The 1983 Births and 
Deaths Registration Act188 provides the legal basis for the Government of Sierra Leone to 
mandate reporting and registration of all deaths in the country.  
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3.3 DESIGN, SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION 
3.3.1 Study I / Paper I 
Study I was based on four cross–sectional, household surveys that were conducted at 
different stages of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone (Figure 4). The first survey was 
conducted in August 2014, the second in October 2014, the third in December 2014, and the 
fourth in July 2015. The peak of weekly new cases of Ebola cases occurred in November 
2014. The first two surveys were conducted before the peak while the last two were carried 
out after the peak. All four surveys employed multi–stage cluster sampling wherein primary 
sampling units (clusters) were randomly selected with probability proportional to size from a 
sampling frame of enumeration areas in the 2004 Sierra Leone Census.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of weekly new Ebola cases against a timeline of surveys in Study I and 
key social mobilization activities, Sierra Leone, May 2014 – August 2015 
Within clusters, a systematic sampling approach was used to select households.189 A 
sampling interval was calculated for each cluster (number of households in the cluster divided 
by the number of households to be sampled). After a random household was selected as the 
starting point, the sampling interval was then used to select additional households in the 
cluster. On average, 20 households were approached for inclusion in each cluster. Within 
households, two individuals were approached for consent to participate in the survey: (i) the 
head of the household and (ii) a randomly selected household member who was either an 
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adult woman (>25 years of age) or a young person (15–24 years of age). Data collectors 
administered a structured questionnaire after obtaining informed consent (Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Outcomes of Ebola–related knowledge, attitudes, and practices measured in Study I 
Items in the initial questionnaire were informed by the broader literature on KAP assessments 
for other communicable diseases.190–193 The questionnaires were pilot tested to inform 
improvements in item–sequencing and local understanding of terminologies for each round of 
data collection. Under the supervision of local linguists, the questionnaires were translated 
orally into the commonly spoken local languages during the training of data collection teams.  
A local NGO, FOCUS 1000, collected the data with technical support provided by other 
outbreak response partners including CDC and UNICEF. A paper–based questionnaire was 
used in the first survey; however, all subsequent surveys were done digitally using Open Data 
Kit (ODK) software application installed in Android tablets. 
3.3.2 Study II / Paper II 
Study II comprised IDIs with public health leaders (N=31), FGDs with HCWs and frontline 
staff (N= 20), and FGDs with members of the general public (N=15). Participants were 
purposively selected from five districts that were experiencing high transmission of Ebola 
during October to December when the STRIVE Ebola vaccine trial was being planned in 
Sierra Leone. All participants were purposefully selected. The IDI participants needed to hold 
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a leadership role at the national or district level to be eligible for inclusion. Specific 
categories of HCWs and frontline workers were eligible for inclusion. To be eligible for the 
FGDs, HCWs needed to be a nurse, medical doctor, or community health officer while 
frontline workers had to be a burial team member, cleaner, community mobilizers, or 
ambulance drivers. From the general public, adult participants were eligible for participation 
in one of three categories of FGDs with adult men aged 25 years or older, adult women aged 
25 years or older, or young persons of either sex aged 18–24 years.  
FOCUS 1000 recruited participants. In each district, HCWs and frontline workers were 
recruited from two health facilities (one district hospital and one other peripheral health unit). 
For the FDGs with members of the general public, participants were recruited from venues 
such as marketplaces and community centers. Data collection was carried out by trained 
interviewers and notetakers with prior experience conducting qualitative research in Sierra 
Leone. The interview and facilitation guides covered attitudes and beliefs about Ebola, 
perceptions and attitudes about experimental Ebola vaccine and vaccine trial, factors that may 
influence vaccine trial participation, and preferred communication channels and influencers. 
Data collection staff only recorded the interview if respondents consented to the recording. 
IDIs with the public health leaders and FGDs with health workers were mainly conducted 
English while FGDs with frontline workers and community members were mostly done in 
Krio. The data collectors debriefed together to discuss and immediately document key themes 
and observations from the IDIs and FGDs. 
3.3.3 Study III / Paper III 
Study III utilized a subset of data from the third survey in Study I that was conducted in 
December 2014 before the implementation of clinical trials of candidate Ebola vaccines in 
Sierra Leone. The design, sampling, and data collection followed the previous description 
outlined in Study–1. Study III focused on items related to Ebola vaccine demand among the 
general public. Ebola vaccine demand was captured by three Likert–type items to measure: 1) 
the perceived need for an Ebola vaccine; 2) willingness to take an Ebola vaccine for oneself if 
offered; and 3) normative beliefs about family members’ willingness to take an Ebola vaccine 
if offered. In addition, perceptions of who should be the first recipient of an Ebola vaccine 
were measured wherein the respondents had an option to choose from one of the following 
categories: me/my family, health care workers, burial teams, political leaders, pregnant 
women, children, the team that is offering the Ebola vaccine to others, people who live in the 
worst affected areas, or other. 
3.3.4 Study IV / Paper IV 
Study IV comprised two components. The first component was a quantitative description of 
the number of deaths reported to the national 1–1–7 system, which eHealth Africa managed 
on behalf of the MoHS during and after the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone.194 For this 
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component, the data comprised monthly unadjusted aggregated data of death alerts placed to 
the 1–1–7 national call center during a five–year period between September 2014 and 
September 2019. The second component was a cross–sectional, telephone–based survey with 
individuals age 18 years and above who reported a death to the 1–1–7 system after the end of 
enhanced Ebola surveillance (starting in July 2016) in Sierra Leone. Survey respondents were 
randomly selected from a stratified sampling frame of individuals that collectively reported 
7,025 deaths to the 1–1–7 system between December 2016 and April 2017. Duplicate 
deaths** were removed from the sampling frame (less than 5% of all deaths). The final 
sampling frame was stratified by region of residence of the person who reported the death 
(West, North, East, South).  
To inform the development and refinement of the survey questionnaire, an FGD was 
conducted with a convenience sample of 12 respondents in Freetown.  The questionnaire was 
piloted with a sample of 25 conveniently selected individuals from the four geographic 
regions. Respondents in the pilot were excluded from the final selection of respondents in the 
survey to prevent repeat–interview bias. Sociodemographic items included region of 
residence, sex, age, education, religion, and occupation. Explanatory items included 
circumstances surrounding the death including the nature of death (accident–related, possible 
stillbirth, possible maternal death), signs and symptoms, place of death, and treatment 
seeking history within the month prior to dying, and past Ebola experience. The main 
outcome measure was motivation to report a death the 1–1–7 system. Response categories of 
motivations included to find out the cause of death, protect self or others from possible 
infection, obey government policy/law, obtain burial permit (to allow traditional burial), 
obtain death certificate, and others. Respondents could select multiple reasons for calling to 
report the death. Trained interviewers administered the telephone survey to respondents 
through a softphone system installed on a computer. Interviewers used ODK software195 
installed on computer tablets to store the responses provided by interviewees. Interviews 
lasted 15–20 minutes on average. 
3.3.5 Study V / Paper V 
Study V used an exploratory qualitative approach that consisted of in–depth interviews with 
individuals who had a death in their household between April and August 2017 but failed to 
report the death to the 1–1–7 system as mandated by the Government of Sierra Leone. The 32 
interviews were carried out in Western Area district (n=16) and Kenema district (n=16). 
Kenema was the early epicenter of the outbreak and has a large rural population. Western 
Area recorded the highest number of cumulative Ebola cases during the outbreak and its 
inhabitants mostly reside in urban areas. Within districts, the sample was further stratified so 
that eight interviews were conducted in communities that had > 50 Ebola cases and the 
 
** Defined as reporting of a single death by two or more people. 
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remaining eight were conducted in communities that had < 10 cases Ebola cases as of the end 
of the outbreak. Within communities, households that experienced one or more deaths 
between April and August 2017 (after the end of the Ebola outbreak and end of enhanced 
Ebola surveillance), were identified by trained data collectors with help from local 
community mobilizers. The household death must not have been reported to the 1–1–7 
system in order to be eligible. Snowball sampling was used to identify additional households 
that may have been missed by community mobilizers. In each selected eligible household, 
one interview was conducted with the household head or next of kin of the deceased person. 
Trained teams of interviewers and notetakers conducted the interviews in local languages. 
The interview guides covered topics on community level practices and perceptions regarding 
the death as well as personal experiences and perceptions regarding the death. All interviews 
were audio–recorded, and on average, the interviews lasted about an hour. The interviewer 
and notetaker debriefed to discuss key themes and observations from the interview.  
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.4.1 Study I / Paper I 
The pooled data from the four surveys were analyzed in Stata version 15 SE (College Station, 
TX: StataCorp LLC), and the use of multi–stage sampling was accounted for using the SVY 
command.196 To understand the potential effects of population–changes in KAP on the 
containment of the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, differences in outcomes between high– 
and low–transmission regions were examined before and after the national peak of the 
outbreak in November 2014. Two binary explanatory variables were created. In the first 
variable, respondents in surveys conducted in August 2014 and October 2014 were 
categorized as before the peak whereas respondents in surveys conducted in December 2014 
and July 2015 were categorized as after the peak (Figure 6). In the second variable, official 
case counts from WHO were used to delineate the respondents’ region of residence into 
high–transmission regions and low–transmission regions.33 This resulted in categorization of 
the Western and Northern regions as high–transmission (>3,000 cases per region) and Eastern 
and Southern regions as low–transmission (<1000 cases per region).  
The pooled KAP survey data were first descriptively analyzed to show frequencies, 
proportions, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of proportions for the KAP outcomes. This 
was followed by the fitting of multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts 
accounting for the random effects of geographic clusters. The models were adjusted for 
region of residence (high–transmission; low–transmission); gender (male, female); age (15–
24 years, >= 25 years); education (no education, primary education, secondary or above); and 
religious affiliation (Muslim, Christian). In all models, an interaction term was then added to 
examine the effects of temporal and geographic interactions on the KAP outcomes. Odds 
ratios (ORs) and their corresponding 95% CIs were calculated to estimate the odds of the 
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KAP outcomes. Testing for statistical significance was based on a two–sided Wald–type test 
with level of significance set to α = 0.05. 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of cumulative Ebola cases against the timeline of the four surveys in 
Study I, Sierra Leone, August 2014 – July 2015 
3.4.2 Study II / Paper II 
The data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis.180 Interview transcripts were 
imported into Dedoose version 8.3.17 web–based platform197 (Manhattan Beach, CA: 
SocioCultural Research Consultants). Texts in the transcripts were coded to reflect condensed 
meaning units after iterative reading of the transcripts. The codes were then categorized to 
reflect a higher–level grouping of concepts. Finally, themes that cut across multiple 
categories of codes were identified.   
3.4.3 Study III / Paper III 
The data were analyzed in Stata version 15 SE (College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC). A new 
variable was created to calculate the composite score for Ebola vaccine demand with possible 
scores ranging from three (3) to eleven (11) based on the three brief Likert–items. The mean 
score was computed and used to dichotomize the variable into low demand (< sample mean) 
and high demand (> sample mean). A multilevel logistic regression model was then used to 
examine the associations between perceptions of who should be the first recipient of an Ebola 
vaccine and expressing a high demand for an Ebola vaccine. The response category 
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indicating “politicians” was set as the reference category because it was hypothesized that 
those wanting politicians to be the first recipients of an Ebola vaccine may have had lower 
demand for the vaccine compared to other respondents who said “me/my family” for 
example. To adjust for demographic variations, the following covariates were included in the 
model: sex, age, education, occupation, and religion. The sociodemographic characteristics 
included in the models have been previously shown to be associated with vaccine uptake.198–
200 Testing for statistical significance was based on a two–sided Wald–type test with level of 
significance set to α = 0.05. 
In addition, to examine construct validity, psychometric attributes of the three brief items 
used to measure Ebola vaccine demand were assessed using Exploratory Factor Analysis 
(EFA). Principal–component factors extraction method was used in the EFA.201 Factor 
loadings, the proportion of variance explained by extracted factors, and a Scree plot of 
eigenvalues were examined. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure was used to determine sampling 
adequacy.201 Reliability was assessed based on the internal consistency of the three items 
with a Cronbach’s alpha value > 0.7 set as the threshold for acceptable scale reliability.202 
3.4.4 Study IV / Paper IV 
In the first part of the analysis, the aggregated monthly number of deaths reported to the 1–1–
7 system were descriptively analyzed and plotted onto a bar graph using Microsoft Excel 
(version 2016) to show monthly death reporting trends during the Ebola outbreak (September 
2014–October 2015), post–outbreak enhanced surveillance (November 2015–June 2016), and 
post–outbreak routine surveillance (July 2016–September 2019). The monthly trends did not 
account for potential duplicate reports given the aggregated format of the data. 
In the second part of the analysis, data from the telephone survey were analyzed using Stata 
version 15 SE (College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC). Two composite binary exposure 
variables were then generated. First, a binary variable was generated to indicate if Ebola–like 
symptoms (fever, diarrhea, vomiting) were present in the decedent (coded 0 for none and 1 
for one or more such symptoms). Second, a binary variable was generated for knowing 
someone who died from Ebola, survived Ebola or quarantined due to Ebola during the 2014–
2016 outbreak (coded 0 for none and 1 for one or more such experiences). In addition, a 
composite outcome variable was created for scoring motivations expressed by respondents, 
which ranged from zero (0) to six (6) depending on the number of motivations expressed. 
Ordered logistic regression models were fitted to estimate ORs and their 95% CIs for various 
associations between explanatory variables and the number of death reporting motivations 
cited by respondents. Specifically, the model was fitted to examine associations between 
motivations to report the death and (a) experiencing Ebola–like symptoms before dying, (b) 
previously calling the 1–1–7 line during the outbreak, and (c) knowing someone who died 
from Ebola, survived Ebola, or was quarantined due to Ebola during the outbreak in Sierra 
Leone. The following covariates were included: respondents’ geographic region of residence, 
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sex, age, education, religion, health worker status) and the decedents’ sex, age, and religion. 
Educational attainment and occupation of the decedents were excluded in the models due to 
their high frequencies of missing values. The covariates in the model were assessed for 
collinearity, and geographic region of residence of the decedents was excluded because it was 
collinear with region of residence of the person who reported the death. Testing for statistical 
significance was based on a two–sided Wald–type test with level of significance set to α = 
0.05.  
3.4.5 Study V / Paper V 
The data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis180 as described in the second study. 
In summary, the interview transcripts were imported into the Dedoose version 8.3.17 web–
based platform197 (Manhattan Beach, CA: SocioCultural Research Consultants) for 
qualitative data management and analysis. Texts in the transcripts were coded to reflect 
condensed meaning units after iterative reading of the transcripts. The codes were then 
categorized to reflect a higher–level grouping of concepts. Finally, two themes that cut across 
multiple categories showed barriers and facilitators related to death reporting after the end of 
enhanced Ebola surveillance in Sierra Leone.   
3.5 ROLE IN STUDIES 
The role of the doctoral candidate in the five studies has been outlined in Table 4. To 
summarize, he was in Sierra Leone throughout the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak working with 
FOCUS 1000 and collaborating with CDC on data collection for Studies I–III. He joined 
CDC in 2016 and led Studies IV–V. Across all studies in this thesis, he led or substantially 
contributed to the design, data collection, and data analysis. He led the writing of the 
constituent doctoral Papers I–V.  
Table 4. Description of role of the doctoral candidate in the various studies 
 Design Training of 
data collectors 
 
Data collection Data analysis/ 
interpretation 
Study 1 Led Led  Supervised Led  
Study 2 Contributed  Contributed  Supervised and conducted 20% 
of interviews 
Led  
Study 3 Led Led Supervised Led 
Study 4 Led Led Supervised Led 
Study 5 Contributed Led training Supervised Led  
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4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Conducting data collection during the outbreak presented cross–cutting ethical challenges. 
First, there was a need to balance the rigor of the research designs with the need to avoid 
excluding at–risk persons from life–saving interventions. Even though experimental designs 
would have yielded the most scientifically sound evidence, they posed serious ethical 
problems. Consequently, observational designs were used in all the studies. Close attention 
was paid to how informed consent was obtained to avoid creating a false perception of 
immediate and direct benefit by participating in the studies. Given that respondents 
sometimes shared with data collectors that they had engaged in risky practices that 
contributed to Ebola transmission risks (e.g. washing of a corpse), thoughtful measures were 
taken to protect their identities so that outbreak response authorities would not levy punitive 
actions against them. Personal identifying information were removed from all datasets and no 
paper trail linking respondents’ identities to their responses were kept.  
Verbal consent was frequently required due to low literacy in Sierra Leone. Moreover, there 
was a need to ensure the safety of the data collection staff to protect them from possible 
Ebola acquisition risks. Safety SOPs were implemented, and all staff were trained on how to 
protect themselves from possible exposures to the Ebolavirus. For instance, all data collection 
staff were trained to avoid all physical contact with study participants (including handshakes), 
maintain social distancing, avoid entering the residence of participants, and practice frequent 
handwashing with soap and water between interviews.  
Each of the studies posed unique ethical challenges that required tailored, mitigating actions. 
In Studies I & III, interviews were conducted with random samples from the general public 
at different points of the protracted Ebola outbreak. Data collection staff sometimes 
encountered sick people suspected of Ebola in households they visited during recruitment. 
There was a need to ensure that such households were not excluded from the studies to avoid 
introducing systematic bias in the sample while also ensuring the safety of data collection 
staff. Moreover, data collectors had an ethical responsibility to inform the heads of such 
households to refer sick persons through the established toll–free 1–1–7 line to get ambulance 
service. The KAP questionnaires contained several questions regarding behavioral intentions 
to report sick people and deaths to the alert line. To avoid biasing the results by providing 
information about the alert line upfront, data collectors were trained to wait to do so after the 
interview ended. Similarly, respondents frequently had questions for the data collection teams 
regarding various aspects of Ebola prevention and treatment. At the end of the interviews, 
data collectors gave respondents an opportunity to ask questions. This meant that data 
collectors had to be equipped with basic knowledge of Ebola transmission, prevention and 
treatment so that they could accurately answer questions posed at the end of the interviews. 
When data collectors were not able to answer certain questions at the end of the interview, 
 38 
 
they asked the inquiring respondents to call the 1–1–7 tollfree line where trained personnel 
would address Ebola questions and concerns.  
In Study II, it was agreed upon ahead of time how to deal with questions that might arise 
from the interviews in the FGDs and IDIs regarding experimental Ebola vaccines. At the end 
of data collection, a factsheet was provided to each participant with information regarding 
what was known about the candidate Ebola vaccines. Data collectors also documented 
questions raised, which were shared with the staff involved in planning the vaccine trial. In 
addition, data collectors had to clarify that participation in the formative research did not 
influence one’s future chances in getting enrolled in the trial to receive an experimental Ebola 
vaccine. Despite these clarifications, it remained unclear how formative research participants 
were motivated by the perception that they may improve their chances of receiving an 
experimental Ebola vaccine.  
In Studies IV–V, unique ethical dimensions were considered because interviews were 
conducted with individuals who had recently experienced the death of a loved one – usually a 
close family member. Data collectors were trained to carefully and respectfully ask questions 
in ways that minimized evoking negative emotional reactions among respondents. However, 
there was no way of knowing how the assessment might have caused emotional distress for 
bereaved participants. In Study V, respondents feared the possible consequences for not 
reporting the deaths as required by the Government of Sierra Leone. Data collectors were 
trained to assure respondents that their identities would not be revealed to the authorities. 
Careful steps were taken to ensure that all data were de–identified, and that anonymity was 
always maintained in the reporting of the data.  
A further reflection on the ethical issues confronted in the respective studies point a key 
lesson learned regarding the conduct of research during a spiraling outbreak. It became clear 
that the research team is even more so the gatekeeper of research ethics because of the chaos, 
desperate need for rapid data collection to inform the outbreak response, and the immediate 
threat of disease transmission, of a potentially lethal disease. Research subjects might become 
motivated to participate in a study due to the ongoing disease threat during the outbreak. 
Careful steps must be taken to avoid unintentional use of the heightened outbreak 
environment to tacitly coerce individuals into participating into research studies. In low 
literacy populations, such as in Sierra Leone, verbal consent in the local language should be 
an option to ensure that every participant fully understands and can weigh the risks and 
benefits of their participation in the research. Under normal research conditions, the 
researcher needs to be ‘removed’ from the research to ensure objectivity and avoid 
introducing biases. However, in an outbreak condition, the researcher might even become 
part of the outbreak response. For instance, the presence of data collectors in households 
during interviews sparked questions from the local community that data collectors had an 
ethical obligation to address to avoid creating misconceptions or interfering with prevention 
or treatment programs.  
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In sum, during a spiraling and chaotic outbreak, the drive to do good may unintentionally 
create conditions that do harm if researchers are not careful about how their studies are 
designed and implemented. The principle of justice should be carefully balanced because 
research conducted on directly affected populations may be disproportionately used for the 
“greater good” of mostly unaffected population. Directly affected persons participating in 
research during outbreaks ought to be treated equally as would have done with the mostly 
unaffected population or during times of non–outbreak conditions. Unequal treatment should 
not be allowed in the guise of a chaotic outbreak setting. Emergency situations, including 
outbreaks, should never be used as an excuse for violating ethical research principles. There 
is always a choice to do good, avoid harm, ensure justice, and respect autonomy. 
4.1 ETHICAL APPROVALS 
All studies in the thesis received ethical approval by the Sierra Leone MoHS and CDC. 
Studies I–III received research approval by the Office of Ethics and Scientific Review 
Committee in the Sierra Leone MoHS. Studies IV–V were deemed as non–research and 
approved by both the Sierra Leone MoHS and CDC as routine public health surveillance.  
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5 RESULTS 
Ebola–related KAP outcome improved over time, especially when comparing results from 
surveys conducted before the peak of the outbreak (August and October 2014) and after the 
peak of the outbreak (December 2014 and July 2015). However, some improvements in KAP 
outcomes were more pronounced in the high–transmission regions compared to the low 
transmission–regions in the country. (Paper I) 
Safety concern was the most recurring barrier to Ebola vaccine acceptability including the 
fear that the vaccine may cause Ebola. This was followed by additional concerns regarding 
the effectiveness of the vaccine in the context of persistent Ebola transmission risk to health 
workers during the outbreak. Despite these barriers, altruism emerged as a major motivating 
factor in wanting to participate in an Ebola vaccine trial to help disrupt transmission during 
the outbreak.  (Paper II)  
About three-quarters of all respondents nationally (74%) expressed high demand for Ebola 
vaccines during the outbreak in Sierra Leone. We found that perceptions of who should be 
the first to take the vaccine if made available to the public was strongly associated with Ebola 
vaccine demand. The psychometric properties of the ultra–brief measure of Ebola vaccine 
demand showed acceptable reliability and evidence of a single construct with acceptable 
factor loadings. (Paper III) 
Analysis of monthly data of deaths reported to the 1–1–7 system showed that on the last 
month of enhanced surveillance (June 2016)††, nearly 4,000 deaths were reported compared 
to <2,500 in the month immediately after (July 2016). The monthly numbers of reported 
deaths continued to plummet and reached as low as 1,550 in January 2017, 673 in January 
2018, and 586 in January 2019. In the survey, we uncovered that people who reported deaths 
were mainly motivated to comply with the Government’s mandate to report all deaths. After 
adjusting for potential confounders, motivation to report was strongly associated with the 
presence of Ebola–like symptoms in the decedent. (Paper IV) 
After the end of the Ebola outbreak, death reporting barriers were mainly due to lack of 
awareness of the mandate to report all deaths and lack of perceived benefits to report. 
However, in the future, respondents expressed willingness to report deaths to the government 
if reciprocal benefits such as ambulance services are provided for reporting. (Paper V) 
5.1 EBOLA KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES, AND PRACTICES  
In Study I, a total of 10,603 respondents across four rounds of data collection consented to 
participate: 1,413 in the first survey in August 2014; 2,086 in the second survey in October 
2014; 3,540 in the third survey in December 2014; and 3,564 in the fourth survey in July 
 
†† Enhanced surveillance lasted from November 8th 2015 to June 30th 2016. 
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2015. The response rate was 98% overall across the four rounds of interviews. In the pooled 
sample: 50% of the respondents were female; 44% of the respondents had no formal 
education; 67% of the respondents identified as Muslim; 21% of the respondents were 
farmers; and 23% of the respondents were students. (Paper I) 
5.1.1 Changes in knowledge and misconceptions  
Correct knowledge of Ebola prevention was high as early as August 2014, but the 
misconceptions were also common. For example, between August 2014 and July 2015, 
knowledge that Ebola is preventable by avoiding contact with corpses increased from 85% to 
95% while the misconception that bathing with salt and hot water prevents Ebola decreased 
from 42% to 15% (Table 5).  
5.1.2 Changes in social acceptance of Ebola survivors  
Social acceptance of Ebola survivors was low in August 2014 in the early stages of the 
outbreak (less than 35% for each of the three measures) but improved very rapidly by 
October 2014. Between August and October 2014, the proportion of respondents expressing 
willingness to welcome Ebola survivors into their communities increased from 22% to 85%, 
which further increased to 89% by July 2015 when the last survey was conducted (Table 5).  
5.1.3 Changes in acceptance of safe burial practices 
Three measures on acceptance of safe burials were first introduced in the second KAP survey 
conducted in October 2014. At this period, intention to avoid touching or washing the corpse 
was high (90%). Alternatives to traditional burials were accepted by 64% of respondents in 
October 2014 but increased to 86% in December 2014 after the outbreak peaked (Table 5).  
5.1.4 Changes in self–reported prevention practices 
In all surveys, nearly every respondent reported uptake of at least one Ebola prevention 
practice (>95%). Between August 2014 and July 2015, handwashing with soap increased 
from 66% to 89%. The most notable increase in self–reported avoidance of suspected Ebola 
patients and corpses occurred between October and December 2014 (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Changes in knowledge, attitudes, and protective behaviors, at four different months of 
the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone, August 2014 – July 2015 
5.1.5 Interaction between time and place 
When compared to the low–transmission regions, there were larger improvements in the 
high–transmission regions regarding intention to wait for a burial team and self–reported 
avoidance of physical contact with suspected Ebola patients (Table 6). Intending to wait for a 
burial team was almost three times greater in high–transmission regions (aOR 6.2; 95% CI 
4.2–9.1) versus in low–transmission regions (aOR 2.3; 95% CI 1.4–3.8) when comparing the 
odds ratios before and after the peak of the outbreak. Increased avoidance of physical contact 
with suspected Ebola patients was also documented in high–transmission areas (aOR 1.9; 
95% CI 1.4–2.5) when comparing before and after the peak of the outbreak (Table 6).  
(Paper I) 
 
  
 
Aug 2014 
N=1,413 
Oct 2014 
N=2,086 
Dec 2014 
N=3540 
Jul 2015 
N=3564 
n % n % n % n % 
Knowledge         
1. Ebola is preventable by avoiding contact with corpse  1182 85 1959 94 3414 97 3327 93 
2. Early medical care of Ebola increases chance of survival 1254 90 1938 93 3372 95 3419 96 
3. Early medical care of Ebola reduces household spread 1284 91 1942 94 3258 92 3294 93 
Misconception         
4. Bathing with salt and hot water prevents Ebola 571 42 717 35 1117 32 534 15 
5. Spiritual healers can successfully treat Ebola 275 20 278 13 207 6 145 4 
6. Traditional healers can successfully treat Ebola 80 6 66 3 66 2 46 1 
Social acceptance of survivors         
7. Would welcome back Ebola survivor into the community 312 22 1772 85 3170 90 3169 89 
8. Would buy fresh vegetables from Ebola survivor 
shopkeeper 
447 32 1462 71 2934 83 2974 84 
9. Ebola survivor student does not put class at risk of Ebola 452 33 1488 72 2541 72 2504 70 
Acceptance of safe burial practices         
10. Would avoid touching or washing the corpse꭛ – – 1873 90 3362 95 3415 96 
11. Would wait for the Ebola burial team to bury the body꭛ – – 1787 86 3404 96 3402 96 
12. Would accept safe alternatives to traditional burial 
rituals꭛ 
– – 1334 64 3049 86 2823 80 
Self–reported prevention practices         
13. Uptake of one or more Ebola protective practice 1344 95 2022 97 3439 97 3455 97 
14. Wash hands with soap and water more often 917 66 1701 82 2790 78 3056 89 
15. Avoid physical contact with suspected Ebola patients 498 35 737 35 1538 43 1122 33 
16. Avoid burials that involve contact with corpse꭛ –  – 569 27 1673 47 1700 49 
*August 2014: total valid responses ranged from 1371 to 1409; missing values excluded (<3% of total responses); October 
2014: total valid responses ranged from 2070 to 2086; missing values excluded (<1% of total responses); December 2014: 
total valid responses ranged from 3534 to 3540; missing values excluded (<1% of total responses); July 2015: total valid 
responses ranged from 3455 to 3563; missing values excluded (<4% of total responses).꭛ Item not included in the first 
survey in August 2014 but introduced in subsequent survey. 
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Table 6. Temporal and geographic interactions in predicting intention to wait for a burial team 
and avoidance of physical contact with suspected Ebola patients, Sierra Leone, August 2014 – 
July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction between time and place 
 
Intention to wait for 
burial team if family 
member died 
Self–reported protective 
practice of avoiding 
physical contact with 
suspected Ebola patients 
Odds ratio& 
(95% CI) 
P value† Odds Ratio& 
(95% CI) 
P value† 
In high transmission regions after the peak compared 
to before the peak  
 
6.2 (4.2–9.1) 
 
0.000 
 
1.9 (1.4–2.5) 
 
0.000 
In low transmission regions after the peak compared 
to before the peak 
 
2.3 (1.4–3.8) 
 
0.001 
 
0.8 (0.6–1.2) 
 
0.283 
Before the peak in low transmission regions 
compared to high transmission regions 
 
4.1 (2.6–6.5) 
 
0.000 
 
3.6 (2.4–5.2) 
 
0.000 
After the peak in low transmission regions compared 
to high transmission regions 
 
1.5 (1.0–2.3) 
 
0.038 
 
1.5 (1.2–2.0) 
 
0.004 
After the peak in low transmission regions compared 
to before the peak in high transmission regions 
 
9.6 (6.1–15.2) 
 
0.000 
 
2.9 (2.1–4.0) 
 
0.000 
&Log odds of KAP outcome = β0 + β1(stage of outbreak) + β2(region) + β3(stage of outbreak x region) + β4(education) + 
β5(sex) + β6(age) + β7(religion) + cluster random intercept;  
†Wald statistical p value from the regression models. 
5.2 ACCEPTABILITY OF EBOLA VACCINES 
In Study II, a total 31 respondents consented to participate in the interviews and 316 
respondents in the 35 FGDs (184 HCWs and frontline workers in 20 FGDs and 132 members 
from the general public in 15 FGDs).   
In Study III, a total of 3,540 respondents from the general public agreed to participate in the 
survey: 49% were females, 33% were between 15–24 years old, 34% had no education, and 
66% identified Islam as their religion. 
5.2.1 Perceptions of experimental Ebola vaccines as a function of trust 
Perceptions of the long–standing childhood immunization program in Sierra Leone had a 
positive influence on how respondents perceived the experimental Ebola vaccines. 
Specifically, the perceived benefits of childhood vaccines in curbing polio and other vaccine–
preventable diseases reinforced trust in vaccines in general. (Paper II) 
“Marklate [vaccine] has been a good thing for us in the country. I remember when we had 
polio but now it’s a thing of the past. We always make sure to get our children vaccinated to 
help them live a strong and healthy life. Without polio vaccine, we would have been dealing 
with so many disabled children who grow to face so many challenges in life” – general public 
member from Western Area district.  
Members of the general public did not know the difference between licensed vaccines (e.g. 
those offered in the childhood immunization program) and experimental vaccines. HCWs and 
frontline workers who would have become the first to receive Ebola vaccines were largely 
viewed as the most trusted sources of information about the vaccine. (Paper II)  
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 “I believe that the medical workers are the best to talk to people [about the vaccine] because 
they would have taken the vaccine. So therefore, people will believe them that the vaccine 
won’t kill them.” – general public member from Port Loko district. 
5.2.2 Safety concerns and efficacy uncertainties as major barriers to 
accepting any experimental Ebola vaccine 
Safety was the most serious concern to regarding willingness to take an experimental Ebola 
vaccine if offered. Specifically, respondents were worried that the vaccine could cause Ebola 
or result in serious adverse events after getting vaccination, including the fear of possible 
death. (Paper II) 
 “…we don’t want them to start with the health workers because if they were to die [from 
taking the vaccine] who will be there to save lives? Many of our colleagues have died during 
this Ebola [outbreak], so doing the test on us health workers has a question about who will 
survive in case of any adverse reactions.” – surveillance officer, Bombali. 
Although HCWs and frontline workers had concerns about the efficacy of Ebola vaccines, 
they expressed willingness to volunteer in pending clinical trials if offered to participate. 
Doubts about the efficacy of the vaccine reinforced the need to continue using personal 
protective equipment after getting vaccinated. (Paper II) 
“I will still continue using the PPE to see first how the vaccine works. I cannot take any risks 
at this point” – burial team member from Bombali district. 
5.2.3 Influence of altruistic intentions and positive vaccination experiences 
on acceptance of experimental Ebola vaccines 
The threat posed by the ongoing outbreak and the high Ebola transmission risk posed to 
HCWs and frontline workers motivated them to altruistically be willing to participate in an 
Ebola vaccine trial to help end the outbreak. (Paper II) 
“I would be comfortable to do so [accept an experimental Ebola vaccine] in the context of 
trying to solve a problem, reduce the risk to humanity and give our people the chance to end a 
disease that has had catastrophic effects on our lives” – medical doctor from Western Area 
district. 
5.2.4 Quantifying public demand for Ebola vaccines 
In Study III, 93% of respondents from the general public agreed that an Ebola vaccine was 
necessary to fight the outbreak, 78% expressed that they were very likely to accept an Ebola 
vaccine for themselves, and similarly, 77% expressed that their family members would be 
very likely to accept an Ebola vaccine. If an Ebola vaccine became available, 37% said 
HCWs should be the first to take the vaccine, which was followed by saying me or my family 
(26%), politicians (14%), the team that is offering the vaccine to others (10%), and people 
who live in worst affected areas (8%). (Paper III)  
The aggregated Ebola vaccine demand score ranged from 3 to 11 (mean=10). After 
dichotomizing the score into high demand (> mean) and low demand (< mean), 74% of 
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respondents expressed high demand for an Ebola vaccine. Expressing high demand for an 
Ebola vaccine was 13 times greater among those who said “me or my family” when 
compared to those who cited politicians (aOR 13.0; 95% CI 7.8–21.6) when asked who 
should receive the vaccine first. On the other hand, expressing high demand was not 
significantly different between respondents who said the team offering Ebola vaccine versus 
those who said politicians should be the first to take the vaccine (aOR 1.4; 95%CI 0.9–2.1) 
(Table 7). (Paper III) 
Table 7. Multilevel logistic regression model for expressing high demand for Ebola vaccine 
among respondents in a national household survey, Sierra Leone, December 2014 
  
  Multivariable Model 
  aOR ‡ (95%CI)  P value †   
Perceived first recipient    
Politicians  Reference  
Me/my family  13.0 (7.8–21.6) 0.000 
Pregnant women  5.7 (1.9–17.5) 0.003 
Children  4.7 (2.4–9.1) 0.000 
People who live in worst affected areas  2.9 (1.7–5.1) 0.000 
Healthcare workers/burial teams  2.0 (1.4–2.8) 0.000 
Other  2.0 (0.9–4.2) 0.051 
The team offering an Ebola vaccine   1.4 (0.9–2.1) 0.157 
Geographic region    
Western Area  Reference  
North Province  1.4 (0.8–2.3) 0.188 
Eastern Province  1.8 (0.9–3.4) 0.057 
Southern Province  1.1 (0.5–2.5) 0.891 
Gender    
Male  Reference  
Female  0.9 (0.8–1.1) 0.426 
Age  1.0 (0.9–1.0) 0.242 
Education    
None  Reference  
Primary  1.1 (0.8–1.5) 0.633 
Secondary or higher  1.6 (1.2–2.1) 0.001 
Religion    
Islam  Reference  
Christianity  1.0 (0.6–1.7) 0.881 
# N=3,290 respondents; 250 (7%) had one or more missing responses that were excluded  
‡ Adjusted odds ratio (aOR) is adjusted for region of residence, sex, age, education, and religion 
† Wald statistical p value from multiple logistic regression model 
CI = confidence interval 
Among the sociodemographic covariates in the multilevel model, only education was 
associated with expressing high demand for an Ebola vaccine when comparing those with 
secondary education or high versus those with no education (aOR 1.6; 95%CI 1.2–2.1)  
(Table 7). (Paper III) 
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5.2.5 Reliability and construct validity of Ebola vaccine demand measure 
The three items used to measure Ebola vaccine demand demonstrated acceptable scale 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79) (Table 8). (Paper III) 
Table 8. Reliability testing for the brief measure of Ebola vaccine demand, Sierra Leone, 
December 2014 
Item Observations Sign 
Item–test 
correlation 
Item–rest 
correlation 
Interitem 
correlation alpha 
Perceived need 3479 + 0.7187 0.3774 0.9297 0.9636 
Intention to accept 3467 + 0.9224 0.8019 0.3375 0.5047 
Normative belief 3435 + 0.9144 0.7763 0.3778 0.5484 
Test scale         0.5491 0.7851 
In EFA, one factor was retained with all three items having factor loadings >0.5. The single 
factor explained 71% of the variance (Table 9). (Paper III) 
Table 9. Eigenvalues and proportion of variance explained by extracted factors in the brief 
measure of Ebola vaccine demand, Sierra Leone, December 2014  
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 2.15 1.34 0.71 0.71 
Factor 2 0.79 0.72 0.26 0.97 
Factor 3 0.07 . 0.03 1.00 
5.3 MORTALITY SURVEILLANCE 
In the first part of Study IV, analysis of monthly numbers of death reported to the national 
1–1–7 system showed a steep decline after the outbreak and enhanced mortality surveillance 
ended. In the year we conducted the survey (2017), a total of 11,642 deaths were reported to 
the 1–1–7 system compared to 32,469 in 2016 and 117,036 in 2015 (Figure 7).  
With an approximate population of 8 million and a national crude death rate of 11.9 per 1000 
population,203 95,000 deaths may be expected occur yearly in Sierra Leone. Based on these 
parameters, albeit not accounting for potential duplicate reports, the number of deaths 
reported in 2017 may have maximally represented nearly 12% of the expected deaths in the 
country versus much higher levels in 2016 (almost 34%) and 2015 (over 100%). (Paper IV) 
In the second part of Study IV, 1,291 (97%) respondents consented to participate in the 
survey out of the 1,330 successfully reached by telephone from a random sample of 4,300 
eligible individuals selected from the national 1–1–7 database of death reporters. Out of the 
sample of respondents, 85% were male, 11% had no formal education, 64% identified as 
Muslims, 56% were family members of the decedents, 52% had previously called the 1–1–7 
line at least once during the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, 49% personally 
knew someone who died from Ebola, 50% personally knew someone who survived Ebola, 
and 58% personally knew someone who was quarantined due to Ebola exposure. (Paper IV) 
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Figure 7. Monthly number of deaths reported to the 1–1–7 system, Sierra Leone, 2014–2019 
5.3.1 Deaths reported after the Ebola outbreak 
In the second part of Study IV, among the sample of 1,291 decedents, 55% were males, 
54% had no education, 79% were Muslims, and 42% were at least 50 years old.  Women of 
reproductive age made up 29% (n=376) of the decedents, of whom 6% (n=24) were pregnant 
at the time of the death. Another 127 deaths (10%) were infants. Accident–related deaths 
comprised 5% (n=59) of all deaths. In terms of health–seeking behavior before dying, 83% of 
decedents reportedly received some form of treatment—mainly from health facilities (82%). 
Frequently cited symptoms that the decedents purportedly experienced within the past month 
of dying were fever (32%), joint pain (21%), headache (20%), and abdominal pain (16%). 
Nearly a third of decedents (31%), reportedly experienced Ebola–like symptoms (fever, 
diarrhea, or vomiting) before dying. (Paper IV) 
5.3.2 Motivations to report deaths after the Ebola outbreak 
In the second part of Study IV, motivations to report deaths were identified among people 
who reported deaths to the 1–1–7 system in Sierra Leone. The most frequently cited 
motivations to report were to obey government policy (82%), find out the cause of death 
(37%), obtain burial permit (29%), and protect self or others from infection (26%) (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Motivations for future reporting deaths to the 1–1–7 system, Sierra Leone, 2017 
Compared to respondents who did not report deaths that exhibited Ebola–like symptoms, 
those who reported such deaths had more than a two–fold increase in the odds of being 
motivated to report (Table 10). (Paper IV) 
Table 10. Ebola–like symptoms and past Ebola experiences and as determinants of death 
reporting motivations, Sierra Leone, April 2017 
  Motivations to report* 
aOR (95%CI) P value † 
Person who died: Experienced symptoms of fever, diarrhea, or 
vomiting before dying 
     No 
     Yes 
 
 
Reference 
2.26 (1.78–2.87) 
 
 
 
0.000 
Person who reported the death: Previously called 1–1–7 line during 
the outbreak 
     No 
     Yes 
 
 
Reference 
1.0 (0.79–1.27) 
 
 
 
0.972 
Person who reported the death: Knew someone who died, survived, 
or was quarantined due to Ebola during the outbreak 
     No 
     Yes 
 
 
Reference 
0.94 (0.73–1.21) 
 
 
 
0.631 
*Total of 1,096 respondents included in the model (complete cases); 195 excluded due to missing data for one 
or more variables. † Wald statistical p value from ordered logistic regression model. AOR = adjusted for all 
main exposure variables plus region of residence, sex (of respondent and deceased person), age (of respondent 
and deceased person), education (of respondent), religion (of respondent and deceased person), occupation (of 
respondent). 
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5.3.3 Barriers to reporting deaths 
In Study V among people who failed to a report a death to the 1–1–7 as mandated by the 
government after the end of enhanced Ebola surveillance, barriers to reporting were driven by 
the lack of awareness to report all deaths, lack of reciprocal benefits linked to reporting, 
negative experiences from the Ebola outbreak, perception that inevitable deaths do not need 
to be reported, and situations where prompt burials may be needed. (Paper V) 
“… I do not think 1–1–7 is still existing because after Ebola we thought that was the end of 
1–1–7. I’m only hearing this from you now. I always listen to the radio, but it has taken a long 
time I did not hear announcement that when someone dies, we are to call 1–1–7; even in the 
villages, that is why I did not remember to call 117.” – respondent from Western Area district 
“I would like them to give us ambulance in the community so when someone dies, they will be 
able to take the person and bury him/her quickly.” – respondent from Kenema district 
“This 1–1–7 line…I don’t want it. I want us to be respecting the [dead] people because the  
1–1–7 was not burying our people properly. So, we are burying our people. Let government 
leave it [burial] up to us. If a doctor checks the body [that’s fine], but don’t let the 1–1–7 – 
come here until we have buried the corpse” – respondent from Kenema district 
5.3.4 Strategies to improve death reporting 
In the telephone survey with death reporters, 94% of respondents expressed that they would 
like the Government of Sierra Leone to keep the 1–1–7 system in place. They also stated their 
preferences for future uses of the 1–1–7 system (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Preferences for future uses of the 1–1–7 system, Sierra Leone, 2017 
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Overall, 80% of the respondents cited that they wanted the system to be used for death 
reporting of all deaths, which was more common among those who never used the 1–1–7 
system during the Ebola outbreak compared to those who did. (Paper IV) 
In the qualitative assessment, facilitators of willingness to report deaths in the future included 
the presence of Ebola–like symptoms in the decedent, occurrence of sudden and unexplained 
deaths, and the existence of other local reporting mechanisms. (Paper V) 
“For any death pertaining to what government told us [we need to report]. That of a bad 
disease like Ebola, laser fever…The people around will not even dare to touch the person, 
because it is a transferable disease and it is more common in eastern province.” – respondent 
from Kenema district 
“Like I said before, when someone dies abruptly, and nothing was wrong with him [before 
dying]. I will just be looking at him, I will not have the knowledge to know the cause of death, 
I will not have the machine to show that this is the sickness that caused the death or whether 
he just fell and died or whether he just sat down and died. When you go to a medical person 
[through 1–1–7], he can confirm that this is the cause of the death. If the doctor has 
confirmed that for real, he has died, what can I do? I just have to go to City Council to obtain 
the burial permit because I cannot go ahead and bury someone without the knowledge of the 
government.” – respondent from Western Area district  
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6 DISCUSSION 
Study I showed that nearly every Ebola KAP outcome improved over time, especially when 
comparing before and after the peak of the outbreak, and some improvements were more 
pronounced in the high–transmission regions compared to the low transmission–regions 
during the outbreak. Study II revealed that perceptions of experimental Ebola vaccines 
influenced trust or mistrust of the clinical trials of Ebola vaccines that were under planning. 
Safety concerns were major barriers to hypothetically agreeing to participate in an Ebola 
vaccine trial. However, altruistic intentions to help end the outbreak and prior positive 
experiences with childhood vaccines influenced willingness to want to volunteer for an 
experimental Ebola vaccine. Study III demonstrated the high public demand for Ebola 
vaccines as expressed by 74% of respondents nationally around the peak of the outbreak. 
Perceptions of who should be the first to take the vaccine if made available to the public was 
significantly associated with Ebola vaccine demand among the public. The psychometric 
properties of the brief measure of Ebola vaccine demand provided evidence of acceptable 
reliability and construct validity. Analysis of monthly data of deaths reported to the 1–1–7 
system in Study IV pointed to a sharp decline after the outbreak and enhanced mortality 
surveillance ended. In the survey in Study IV, it was further uncovered that people who 
reported deaths were mainly motivated to comply with the Government’s mandate to report 
all deaths, and motivations to report were more pronounced if Ebola–like symptoms were 
present in the decedent. Study V then highlighted important barriers for why some people 
failed to report deaths to the 1–1–7 system after the outbreak and enhanced mortality 
surveillance had ended. Death reporting barriers were primarily driven by lack of awareness 
of the government’s mandate to report all deaths and lack of perceived reciprocal benefits to 
report. Consequently, willingness to report deaths to the government may be enhanced if 
reciprocal benefits such as ambulance services are provided for reporting. 
6.1 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
6.1.1 Improvements in Ebola knowledge, attitudes, and practices  
Behavior change at large–scale during outbreaks were not well understood prior to the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa. The West Africa Ebola outbreak did not have a blueprint to follow 
because of its scale and complexity. Study I represents the first population–level evaluation 
of changes in Ebola–related KAP at different stages of an Ebola outbreak. Previously, 
mathematical models have been used to quantify the potential role of behaviors in containing 
the outbreak. Use of real–time data from an actual Ebola outbreak to answer the question of 
when and where behavior changed has not been done so far in any of the affected countries. 
This is because such data are limited. Out of the three Ebola–affected countries in West 
Africa, Sierra Leone was the first to conduct a nationwide household KAP survey in August 
2014 several months before the peak of the outbreak.93 Three more follow–up surveys, using 
the same methodology and repetition of core items, were implemented at different stages of 
 52 
 
the outbreak including right before the peak (October 2014), right after the peak (November 
2014), and near the end of the outbreak in the country (July 2015). Lessons from the KAP 
surveys in Sierra Leone also directly informed similar KAP assessments in Liberia and 
Guinea but those were one–off data collection efforts.122 125 The data analyzed and presented 
in Study I provide an opportunity to adapt the methods and data collection instruments in 
future outbreaks of Ebola.  
6.1.2 Demand for Ebola vaccine during an outbreak 
 In Study III, the level of Ebola vaccine acceptability in Sierra Leone among the general 
public was similar to other assessments in the country, Guinea, and DRC. A survey among 
general public participants in Sierra Leone’s Western Area Rural district in March 2015 
revealed that 73% of respondents were willing to take an Ebola vaccine if provided free–of–
charge but only 27% were willing to do so if they had to pay for it.204 A national household 
survey in August 2015 in Guinea found similar levels of acceptability of Ebola vaccines such 
that that 86% of respondents perceived that an Ebola vaccine was needed to help end the 
outbreak while a similar proportion (84%) were willing to accept the vaccine if it became 
available to them.205 In 2018 in DRC, Ebola ring vaccination efforts (vaccination of contacts 
and contacts of contacts of exposed people) were met with challenges underpinned by 
institutional mistrust and misinformation about the vaccine.206 There has been documented 
instances of outright refusals of Ebola vaccines in the outbreaks in West Africa and DRC.163 
207 The high public demand for Ebola vaccine documented in Study III may have been 
driven by the perceived threat posed by the widespread transmission, which is consistent with 
the finding that respondents with high demand for the vaccine were more likely to express 
that the vaccine should first be offered to them and their families if it became available. 
6.1.3 Informing ethical and culturally responsive Ebola vaccination 
strategies   
While the findings from Study III were important in quantifying Ebola vaccine demand 
among the general public around the peak of the outbreak, the qualitative results from Study 
II provided more in–depth understand regarding potential barriers and motivations related to 
Ebola vaccine demand in the context of ongoing planning of Ebola vaccine trials.  The 
preliminary findings from Study II were particularly useful in informing ethical and 
culturally responsive communication strategies for informed consent processes in the 
STRIVE Ebola vaccine trial in Sierra Leone, which eventually enrolled more than 8,000 
participants in less than a year.154 156  
 
The 2019 licensing of the Ebola vaccine by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is major  
step in cementing the important role that vaccination strategies will play in outbreaks of 
Ebola.166 The need to continue to monitor the behavioral drivers of Ebola vaccine uptake 
should remain a global health security priority. The brevity, reliability, and construct validity 
of the three items used to measure Ebola vaccine demand in Study III present an opportunity 
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for rapidly adapting and incorporating these items into other planned assessments during 
future Ebola outbreaks.  
6.1.4 Transitioning Ebola death reporting systems for routine mortality 
surveillance  
After the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone ended in November 2015, a key aspect of the 
enhanced surveillance instituted by the Government was to sustain the reporting of all deaths 
to the national 1–1–7 system as was done during the outbreak period. Study IV showed that 
the reporting level dropped during the enhanced surveillance period, and that the 1–1–7 
maximally captured 34% of the total expected deaths compared to about 100% of the 
expected deaths in 2015 during the last year of the outbreak. After enhanced Ebola 
surveillance ended in June 2016, reporting levels continued to plummet and eventually 
stabilized to capturing about 12% of the expected deaths. Because the aggregated monthly 
summary data did not account for potential duplicate reports of deaths, the lower reporting 
level may have been influenced by fewer duplicate reporting after the outbreak. Given the 
lack of unique identifiers in the source database for the 1–1–7 call center it may never be 
possible to understand the role of duplicate reporting. However, it is plausible that duplicate 
reporting was mainly predominant in 2014 during the early stages of the outbreak in Sierra 
Leone when ambulance teams were sometimes slow to respond to death alerts. Multiple 
household members or others from the community may have kept calling the 1–1–7 system 
to report the same death to get a safe burial team to respond to the death.  
6.2 THEORETICAL GROUNDING OF THE FINDINGS 
Glanz et al. have described the role of theories in explaining health–related behaviors,208 
which have been further synthesized by the U.S. National Institutes of Health.209 The findings 
from the respective studies in this thesis are enhanced when theoretical concepts are applied 
to them; namely Health Belief Model (HBM), Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), Social 
Cognitive Theory (SCT), and Diffusion of Innovation. These theories generally assume that 
behavior change, or behavior adoption, is a rational process; as such they are considered 
cognitive–behavioral theories. Given the chaotic setting of the spiraling outbreak where fear 
played an important role, behavior adoption may not have always been an entirely rational 
process as outlined in cognitive–behavioral theories such as HBM, TPB, and SCT. Affective 
factors such as emotions likely influenced both prevention and risk behaviors in ways that are 
still not well understood. Media effects may have contributed to both cognitive and emotional 
drivers of behaviors.  It is important to note that no single theory alone can sufficiently 
explain behavior, especially in the context of a complex Ebola outbreak that people, their 
governments, and society were grappling with at an unprecedented pace. 
The Social Ecological Framework (SEF) asserts that behaviors are influenced through 
multiple levels of the social ecology: individual, interpersonal, community, institution and 
policy.208 A single health behavior theory usually explains behavior at one of these levels. 
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However, to fully understand the drivers of behavior, multiple theories may be applied across 
multiple levels of the SEF. In Table 1, the SEF has been used to guide the grouping of 
theories and their linkages to the key findings in Studies I–V of the thesis. 
Table 11. Theoretical linkages of the findings using the Social Ecological Framework 
Level Theory Study Relevant behavioral concepts 
Individual Health Belief 
Model 
Studies I–V Perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
perceived benefits, perceived costs, cue to 
action, self–efficacy 
Theory of Planned 
Behavior 
Studies I–V Subjective norm, perceived behavioral 
control, behavioral intention 
Interpersonal Social Cognitive 
Theory 
Study I Reciprocal determinism, observational 
learning (modeling) 
Community Diffusion of 
Innovation 
Studies  
I, IV, V 
Innovation, communication channels, social 
systems, time 
6.2.1 Health Belief Model  
The Health Belief Model is relevant to the findings from all five studies in the thesis in 
explaining behavior change at the individual level of the SEF. To summarize, the HBM states 
that behavior change is driven by the perceived threat (perceived susceptibility and perceived 
severity of a disease), perceived benefits and costs, cues to action (e.g. reminders), and self–
efficacy (confidence to perform the behavior).208 209  
In Study I, a complex interplay of the HBM constructs likely played a role in influencing 
uptake of Ebola prevention behaviors. As people observed their family members, neighbors, 
and health workers acquire Ebola and then often die, the perceived threat of Ebola 
transmission may have motivated people to practice frequent handwashing and to avoid 
physical contact with corpses and suspected Ebola patients. However, additional research is 
needed to empirically understand the relationship between Ebola risk perceptions and Ebola 
prevention behaviors. Cues to action in the form of reminders may have reinforced the 
promoted action. People in Sierra Leone were exposed to various information sources (radio, 
television, posters, etc.) reminding them to engage in the promoted prevention behaviors (e.g. 
handwashing, reporting suspected Ebola patients, avoiding traditional burials).129 Physical 
cues were also used such as handwashing stations. Over time, people likely increased their 
self–efficacy to perform the promoted behaviors, which may have been accomplished 
through multiple attempts of executing the behavior or by receiving social support 
interventions such as those provided by community leaders and peers during the outbreak. 
Participants in Study II made clear that they were mainly willing to accept an experimental 
Ebola vaccine to protect themselves and their patients to help end the outbreak. They weighed 
the perceived benefits against the perceived cost of accepting an experimental vaccine. 
Although there were no financial costs, other perceived costs that emerged included serious 
adverse events following vaccination including the fear of death as a result of taking an 
experimental vaccine. The findings from Study II were therefore important to ensure ethical 
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communication of the risks and benefits to potential participants of Ebola vaccine trials to 
guide the informed consent processes, procedures, and framing of language.  
In Study III, Ebola vaccine demand was greatest among those who thought they or their 
families should be the first to get the vaccine if it became available, and nearly everyone said 
an Ebola vaccine was necessary to help end the outbreak. These findings are consistent with 
the perceived benefits of an Ebola vaccine helping to curb the outbreak, especially given that 
Studies II–III were conducted around the peak of the outbreak when the perceived threat of 
Ebola transmission may have been pronounced in the population. 
Motivations to report deaths were greater among respondents in Study V who reported a 
death where the decedent experienced Ebola–like symptoms. These respondents may have 
perceived a benefit to report to avoid transmission if the death turned out to be Ebola. In 
Study V, respondents also expressed willingness to report deaths suspected of Ebola or due 
to other contagious infections. Consistent with HBM’s construct on perceived benefit, 
positive reciprocity also helps explain the expectation expressed by respondents in Study V 
that reciprocal in–kind benefits (such as ambulance services) should be provided to 
incentivize death reporting.210 211   
6.2.2 Theory of Planned Behavior 
Like HBM, Theory of Planned Behavior is a cognitive–behavioral, expectancy theory that 
attempts to explain behavior adoption through the formation of behavioral intentions that are 
influenced by attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norm (expectations of important 
people), and perceived behavioral control (one’s ability to exert control over the behavior).208 
209 TPB explains behavior change at the individual level of the SEF. 
In Study I, the findings showed consistent improvement in behavioral intentions regarding 
safe burials, which were associated with improvements in attitudes toward safe burials. While 
perceived behavioral control was not directly assessed in Study I, the increased acceptance of 
safe alternatives was likely an indication of increased perceived behavioral control among 
respondents. Safe alternatives, such as allowing family members to observe the burial and 
having a religious leader say a final prayer, may have made people feel more in–control of 
the burial even though they were prohibited from having physical contact with the corpse. 
Replacing the risky behavior with safe practices likely enhanced families’ perceived control 
over the burial.  
Studies II–III provided evidence to suggest that attitudes toward Ebola vaccines influenced 
behavioral intentions to accept the vaccine if offered, which is consistent with the assertion of 
TPB. In Study III, the normative belief that family members would accept an Ebola vaccine 
was associated with intention to accept an Ebola vaccine for oneself.  
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In Studies IV–V, decisions to report or not report deaths to the 1–1–7 system after the 
outbreak ended may have been driven by subjective norms. People who reported deaths to the 
1–1–7 system cited that they were mostly motivated to obey the government’s mandate to 
report all deaths while those who failed to report said they were unaware of any such 
requirement. Among those who did not report, they perceived that the reporting system was 
only used during the Ebola period. Perceived behavioral control may have also played a role 
in reporting behaviors. In Study IV, the results showed that respondents who wanted to see 
the 1–1–7 system continued for death reporting purposes were more likely to not have called 
the line during the outbreak period. Past negative experiences from reporting deaths through 
the system – such as burial delays – may have reduced the perceived behavioral control 
among those who reported during the outbreak. 
6.2.3 Social Cognitive Theory 
Social Cognitive Theory explains behavior change or adoption at the interpersonal level of the 
SEF through the reciprocal tendencies between people and those they are surrounded by in 
their social networks – including family members, neighbors, and community leaders. The 
SCT strongly highlights the effects of social learning through observations (or role modeling) 
on behavior.208 209 In applying the SCT to the findings, particularly those from Study I, the 
increased acceptance of safe burial behaviors was likely influenced by intrinsic social 
learning as well as through extrinsic social mobilization including role–modeling and 
promotion of safe burials by respected religious leaders.  
6.2.4 Diffusion of Innovations 
Novel interventions were required to be implemented at large scale during the Ebola 
outbreak. The most consequential, perhaps, was the introduction of safe burials that replaced 
unsafe traditional burials. Safe burial was an ‘innovation’ because it was new to Sierra 
Leoneans as a result of the outbreak. Diffusion of Innovations usually looks at the voluntary 
spread and uptake of “new products, ideas, and social processes.”209 Even though safe burials 
were mandated by the Government of Sierra Leone, compliance was suboptimal in the initial 
stages of the outbreak. In fact, it has been estimated that about three new Ebola cases 
emerged from every unsafe burial during the outbreak in West Africa.64 The novel practice of 
safe burial needed to be diffused at an optimal level to minimize household and community 
spread of the Ebolavirus. In doing so, the theory suggests that the communication channels, 
social system, and time are critical constructs for behavior adoption.209 For instance, the use 
of trusted religious leaders and community leaders to communicate the need for and benefits 
of safe burials may have contributed to catalyzing adoption of safe burials. Such messages 
likely propagated through social networks and over time became widely accepted.  
  
 57 
 
6.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
6.3.1 Study designs and sampling 
All the studies were based on observational designs with cross–sectional data collected at 
different points during the outbreak (Studies I–III) and after the outbreak (Studies IV–V). 
Given the fast–evolving context of the Ebola outbreak, the cross–sectional data only reflected 
snapshots from the specific data collection period. Considerations were not given to doing 
longitudinal data collection because it was anticipated that repeat–interviews with the same 
individuals may have influenced the responses over time. For example, in Studies I–III, at 
the end of each interview, an Ebola factsheet was provided to interviewees as part of ethical 
obligations during a widespread outbreak. Therefore, the post–interview provision of a 
factsheet may have influenced Ebola–related KAP outcomes if data collection was instead 
done with cohorts of individuals using a longitudinal design. However, having multiple 
cross–sectional rounds of data collection in Study I was important to establish trends over 
time in Ebola KAP outcomes at the population–level. 
The exploratory qualitative design in Study II had major strengths in that perceptions of 
experimental Ebola vaccines were obtained from multiple categories of participants (HCWs, 
frontline workers, and the general public). Qualitative data collection was useful in eliciting 
in–depth understanding of complex and nuanced issues that otherwise may be missed by 
quantitative assessment. A grounded theory approach, which was not used in Study II, may 
have allowed for more theoretical grounded results. For instance, use of theoretical sampling 
would have meant conducting follow–up interviews with the same respondents to clarify 
aspects of the prior interviews and selecting subsequent respondents based on analysis of data 
from previous interviews as part of the theory formation process. A grounded theory 
approach was not used because it is usually time and resource intensive. Given the fluidity 
and fast pace of the outbreak, a more rapid exploratory qualitative design was deemed the 
most suitable to meet the study objectives. In Study II, specific information on respondents’ 
individual level experiences with Ebola was not collected, which limits the understanding of 
how variability in Ebola experiences may have potentially influenced perceptions and 
hypothetical acceptability of experimental Ebola vaccines.  
Studies IV–V were designed to complement each other in trying to understand motivations 
(Study IV) and barriers (Study V) to reporting deaths in the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak 
following the end of enhanced Ebola surveillance in Sierra Leone. A major strength of Study 
V is the deployment of a national telephone–based survey using the computerized softphone 
system installed at the 1–1–7 call center in Freetown. Without precedent for doing telephone 
surveys in Sierra Leone, the sample size calculation needed to assume a conservative 
response rate. In the end, 1,330 respondents out of the 4,300 randomly selected phone 
numbers from the 1–1–7 database were reachable by phone after three attempts. While the 
sample obtained (1,291 respondents) was sufficiently large to allow for the planned analysis, 
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it remains unclear if systematic biases were introduced due to the non–response rate. 
Specifically, the differences between those who were not reached versus the sample obtained 
cannot be ascertained. For instance, people with phones that consistently remained switched 
off and hence unreachable could have been of lower socioeconomic status. Continuity in 
electrical power supply is a challenge in Sierra Leone. Therefore, poor people may have been 
more likely to suffer from power outages that prevented them to keep their phones charged. It 
is unclear if and how having fewer poor respondents in the sample may have influenced the 
results. Across all population groups, other mundane reasons such as losing of phones or 
changing of phone numbers may also explain why some numbers could not be reached after 
multiple attempts on different times of the day. 
Study V was conducted as a follow–up to Study IV and used an exploratory qualitative 
approach to understand death reporting barriers among people who failed to report a death as 
mandated by the Government after the end of the enhanced Ebola surveillance period. A key 
strength of the study design was the selection of two districts that had epidemiological 
importance during the outbreak period; whereas Kenema district was part of the initial 
epicenter in the region, Western Area hosts the capital city where the highest number of 
Ebola cases were reported. It is therefore plausible that barriers unique to the other 12 
districts were missed in the assessment. 
6.3.2 Internal validity and implications for causal inference 
Internal validity looks at the rigor of a study’s design and the extent to which a causal 
relationship can be inferred between the independent variables and the outcomes.212 Various 
threats to internal validity arise when confounding variables not accounted for in the study 
may have been responsible for the observed outcomes. There are seven major threats to 
internal validity212 213: history (e.g. historical events that influence the study outcomes); 
maturation (e.g. aging of the study’s participants); biases due to repeated testing (e.g. 
participants learn from previous test itself); instrumentation (e.g. changes to how the 
outcomes are measured); regression (e.g. participant with extreme outcome scores regress to 
the mean); selection biases (e.g. lack of randomization that leads to differences between 
groups in the study); and attrition due to the differential loss of participants over time. 
All studies in this thesis employed observational designs, which posed limitations to establish 
causal relationship between independent variables and the measured outcomes. Experimental 
designs were either not feasible or suitable for numerous reasons. Randomization of people 
into intervention and control groups would have meant withholding life–saving interventions 
on Ebola prevention from people in the control group who were at risk of getting infected 
with Ebola. It was therefore unethical, and perhaps impractical, to randomize communities or 
individuals into behavior change interventions during a widespread outbreak. 
As a result, while major interventions implemented during the outbreak have been outlined in 
the various constituent papers in this thesis, an attempt to make a causal link between these 
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interventions and the changes in the observed outcomes over the course of the outbreak is not 
appropriate. This is an inherent limitation across the board when attempting to identify the 
drivers of behavior change during an ongoing large–scale outbreak such as the Ebola 
outbreak in Sierra Leone. Such limitation reinforces a larger point that researchers in an 
outbreak setting cannot always opt for the most scientifically rigorous designs because at–
risks persons may be denied life–saving interventions and treatment. Notwithstanding 
limitation of using a non–experimental design, the data from the serialized cross–sectional 
national behavioral surveys in Study I provide novel evidence in trying to answer the big–
picture questions regarding when and where behavioral changes occurred during the largest 
outbreak of Ebola in recorded history. 
In future outbreaks, there is a need to develop and test novel methods to assess the effects of 
interventions on prevention and treatment behaviors, and in turn, to further try to establish 
effects of uptake in behaviors on containment of the outbreak. The estimates of trends in 
population–level behavioral outcomes from Sierra Leone may be integrated into future 
mathematical models looking to predict the impact of behaviors on containing Ebola 
outbreaks. So doing would represent an important methodological advancement given that 
past mathematical models scarcely used actual behavioral surveillance data in the modeling 
parameters.214 
6.3.3 External validity and implications for generalizability 
External validity largely deals with the generalizability of a study’s results.212 Probability 
sampling was used in Studies I, III, & IV whereby respondents were randomly selected 
from respective sampling frames. In Studies I & III, national population–based samples 
were obtained using multi–stage cluster sampling whereas in Study IV a stratified national 
random sample of death reporters was obtained. Therefore, the results from Studies I, III, & 
IV may be considered generalizable but with some limitations. Notably, the first KAP survey 
in Study I only contained nine out of the 14 districts, and respondents with secondary school 
education were overrepresented in the pooled sample from the four surveys. Differences 
between or across geographic regions could not be accounted for based on the delineation of 
Ebola cases alone for high– versus low–transmission regions. Moreover, the multistage 
sampling strategy in Study I may not have yielded a representative sample of households and 
individuals in urban settings. Notwithstanding this limitation, the sample from the pooled 
KAP surveys largely mirrored the population of people aged 15 years and above in Sierra 
Leone when compared to results from the Sierra Leone Demographic and Health Survey 
conducted in 2013.96 The sample of deaths reported obtained in Study V largely mirrored the 
demographic characteristics of deaths nationally as per the most recent census mortality 
data.181 In Studies II & V, the findings cannot be generalized due to the use of non–
probability sampling. Purposive sampling was used in the qualitative studies. However, it 
should be noted that generalization was not the purpose of the qualitative assessments. 
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Instead, the studies aimed to obtain rich understanding and subjective interpretations 
regarding nuances and complexities related to experimental Ebola vaccine acceptance and 
failure to report deaths to the 1–1–7 system. 
6.3.4 Construct validity and implications for meaning 
The KAP survey questionnaire items used in Study I were not psychometrically validated to 
ascertain construct validity prior to their deployment given the urgency of the outbreak. 
However, all items were pilot–tested and revised accordingly to improve the framing, 
wording, and sequencing of the items to enhance their understanding among respondents. 
Adaptations of the Sierra Leone KAP items in Guinea and Liberia produced similar results, 
which suggests the suitability of using these items during the outbreak in West Africa. 
Acceptable internal consistency and evidence of a single construct that measured Ebola 
vaccine demand was demonstrated in Study III, which used a subset of the dataset from 
Study I (i.e. the third KAP survey). The extent to which the Ebola vaccine demand scale in 
Study III may predict uptake of Ebola vaccine could not be determined because respondents 
had not been offered the vaccine at the time of the assessment. Nevertheless, the findings 
from Sierra Leone are consistent with the results from a survey of Ebola vaccine recipients in 
DRC, which showed that institutional trust predicted the intention to accept an Ebola 
vaccine.163 In Study IV, FGDs were conducted to inform the development of the items to 
include in the telephone survey, which was followed by piloting of the items with a 
convenience sample. These steps enhanced the framing, wording, and sequencing of the 
items. Psychometric validation was not deemed necessary given that the items were each 
aiming to capture single indicators, respectively.  
6.3.5 Social desirability bias 
Across all studies in the thesis there was a potential for respondents to provide responses that 
reflected messages they received through community engagement and risk communication 
efforts. However, it was difficult to discern specific instances where social desirability may 
have occurred during data collection. One potential area is in Study I when respondents were 
asked if they had taken any actions to prevent Ebola. Nearly everyone said “yes” to this 
question. However, given the scale of the outbreak, it may be reasonably expected that 
everyone had tried to take some action to stay safe from Ebola. We anticipated this potential 
social desirability bias and followed–up with an open–ended question asking respondents to 
specifically cite the actions that they had taken. Interviewers were trained to not read any of 
the options but instead to just use a simple probe: “What else have you done to stay safe?” 
They probed until the interviewee gave an exhaustive list of all the actions that he/she had 
taken to prevent Ebola. The pre–coded response options in the questionnaire also included 
actions that were not proven prevention behaviors (e.g. drinking of traditional herbs to 
prevent Ebola). This allowed data collectors to capture a diverse range of possible responses. 
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In Study II, while the FGDs offered the advantage of individuals sharing experiences and 
building off each other’s insights, participants may have been less likely to express attitudes 
that differed from emerging group consensus. These potential limitations were mitigated by 
facilitation techniques that strived to offer equal opportunity to all participants to freely 
express their views on the range of issues discussed. In Studies II & V, especially, power 
relations between participants and interviewers may have influenced the responses 
generated,215 including the potential for social desirability bias or withholding of information. 
In Study IV, most respondents who reported a death said they did so to obey the 
Government’s mandate to report all deaths. It is challenging to discern if respondents 
provided socially desirable responses to match their perceived expectations of the 
interviewers and/or to reflect messages communicated to them by their government. The 
potential for respondents to predominantly provide socially desirable responses may have 
been reduced by having experienced and well–trained data collection teams who facilitated 
openness in dialogue. Open–ended probes were used to follow–up on statements made by 
participants by asking them: “can you tell me more about that?” Facilitators were trained to 
explicitly encourage participants to be candid in their responses and to ensure that every 
participant had an opportunity to contribute to the discussion. These facilitation techniques 
may have helped to mitigate some of the social desirability bias.   
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
It is feasible to conduct serialized population–level assessments of behavior change during a 
complex outbreak of Ebola. Knowledge, attitudes, and prevention practices improved 
nationally during the outbreak in Sierra Leone, and the magnitude of improvement was 
greater in high–transmission regions when compared to low transmission regions. With the 
available data, it is impossible to discern the impact of behavior change on containment of the 
outbreak in Sierra Leone. However, the results presented in the thesis are consistent with 
mathematical modeling demonstrating that behavior change played an important role in 
bringing the outbreak to an end.89 The temporal and geographic estimates of improvements in 
Ebola–related behavioral intentions and prevention practices documented in this thesis can 
inform behavioral parameters in future mathematical models attempting to understand and 
predict the epidemiology of an Ebola outbreak or other similar infectious disease outbreaks. 
Understanding the drivers of Ebola vaccine acceptability and demand was important to 
inform ethical and cultural considerations in the implementation of experimental Ebola 
vaccines in Sierra Leone. Health workers should not be viewed separately from the 
communities where they live and work. Social dynamics in their communities shape the 
behaviors of health workers. When coupled with qualitative data, a brief measure of vaccine 
demand may be useful in outbreak settings where rapid data collection can inform real–time 
vaccination strategies to help contain the outbreak. 
While the 1–1–7 system was ramped up to capture most deaths during the outbreak, reporting 
substantially declined after the outbreak ended. Failure to report deaths after the outbreak was 
mainly due to lack of awareness to report all deaths and lack of perceived benefits to report in 
the post–Ebola–outbreak setting in Sierra Leone. Knowledge and experiences gained from 
the Ebola outbreak may have been responsible for the increased motivation to report deaths 
that exhibited Ebola–like symptoms after the Ebola outbreak ended in Sierra Leone. Post–
Ebola–outbreak settings offer an opportunity to implement routine mortality surveillance, 
however, substantial social mobilization efforts may be required to optimize reporting. 
Community engagement is a process, and behavior change may take some time to be realized 
at the optimal level needed to slow down the epidemiological curve of an Ebola outbreak. 
Emphasis should be placed on the high–risk behaviors (i.e. avoiding contact with suspected 
patients and corpses) from the early stages of the outbreak. Intensified social mobilization 
should be prioritized in the high–transmission regions to help translate knowledge and 
intentions into behavior change.  
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8 RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Social mobilization should be prioritized early as a critical pillar of an Ebola outbreak 
response and must be informed by data on behavioral insights. 
 
• Use of mixed–methods behavioral surveillance assessments should be considered 
early and throughout an Ebola outbreak to inform interventions, strategies, and 
policies. 
 
• Looking into the future, standardized indicators and methods for measuring Ebola–
related KAP should be adopted by Ebola outbreak–prone countries and regions in 
order to facilitate comparable understanding of prevention behaviors within and 
across countries and populations.  
 
• Novel research and evaluation designs are needed to better establish the effects of 
social mobilization on improvements on Ebola–related KAP.  
 
• Ebola outbreak responses need to prioritize structured and well–planned engagements 
with communities in order to facilitate uptake of prevention behaviors such as 
avoidance of unsafe traditional burials and caregiving practices.  
 
• Implementing experimental vaccines during an outbreak require complex ethical and 
cultural considerations. With the advent of a licensed Ebola vaccine, future Ebola 
vaccination strategies during outbreaks also need to be informed by in–depth 
understanding of local barriers and facilitators of vaccine uptake. 
 
• People should be made aware of the benefits and potential risks of receiving an 
experimental Ebola vaccine in ways that are ethically responsible and culturally 
appropriate to avoid tacit coercion in the guise of a chaotic outbreak environment 
where the perceived disease threat is heightened among the population. 
 
• If death reporting is mandated after an Ebola outbreak has ended, the government 
should ensure that the death reporting policy is clearly communicated to the public 
using plain language.  
 
• Reporting benefits need to be incorporated into routine mortality surveillance and 
communicated to the public to incentivize optimal reporting. 
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• Localized and informal practices for death notification to community leaders, 
including religious leaders, should be leveraged to expand the number of deaths 
captured in a mortality surveillance system.   
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